GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the
Public’s Casualty Sensitivity
Steven L. Schooner
George Washington University Law School, sschooner@law.gwu.edu

Collin D. Swan
George Washington University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Government Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Schooner, Steven L. and Swan, Collin D., "Dead Contractors: The Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the
Public’s Casualty Sensitivity" (2012). GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works. 59.
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/59

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

DEAD CONTRACTORS [POST] (DO NOT DELETE)

4/4/2012 3:46 PM

Dead Contractors:
The Un-Examined Effect of Surrogates on the
Public’s Casualty Sensitivity
Steven L. Schooner and Collin D. Swan**
Casualty sensitivity may be thought of as price sensitivity to the
human cost of war.1
We’re simply not going to go to war without contractors. We have
to build that into what we call readiness, what we call training,
what we call leadership and what we call war planning.2
I. THE PRICE OF WAR
In a representative democracy, few decisions are more significant or
heavily scrutinized than the decision to engage in heavy, sustained, military
action abroad.3 Once the nation commits to an operation, decisions
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1. Christopher Gelpi & John Mueller, The Cost of War: How Many Casualties Will
Americans Tolerate?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 139.
2. Statement of Ashton B. Carter, Under Sec’y of Def. for Acquisition, Tech. &
Logistics, before the Comm’n on Wartime Contracting: Better Buying Power in Defense
Spending 39 (Mar. 28, 2011) (oral testimony), available at http://www.wartime
contracting.gov/docs/hearing2011-03-28_transcript.pdf. The authors discussed an earlier
version of this paper at a forum of the Commission on Wartime Contracting. See Public
Forum, COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING (May 2, 2011), http://www.wartime
contracting.gov/index.php/hearings/publicforum. On August 31, 2011, the Commission
released their Final Report to Congress. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ &
AFG., TRANSFORMING WARTIME CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS 30
(2011), available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf
[hereinafter COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT].
3. There has been much debate over the years concerning the proper role that
Congress and the executive should play in the decision to engage in military operations. See,
e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, DECIDING TO USE FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS IN A
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regarding how long to remain are hotly debated. Public support for
sustained military engagements, especially those involving long-term
deployment of ground forces, is scrupulously observed and dissected.4
Within this complicated calculus,5 several significant factors determine
whether the public will support these operations. The most graphic is the
number of soldiers who have died on the nation’s behalf. Indeed, in the
absence of a strong national imperative or a widely-held belief in the
operation’s success, the total number of American fatalities becomes the
most quantifiable and readily accessible metric of public interest. Most
recent studies suggest that “[m]ajorities of the public have historically
considered the potential and actual casualties in U.S. wars and military
operations to be an important factor in their support.”6 Specifically, an
inverse relationship exists between the number of military deaths and public
support.7 Economists have dubbed this the “casualty sensitivity” effect.8
SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES (2005), available at http://www.constitution
project.org/pdf/War_Powers_Deciding_To_Use_Force_Abroad.pdf. For the war-related
powers of Congress and the President, see U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall
have Power . . . To declare War, [and] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . ); U.S.
Const., art. II, §2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, and the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service
of the United States . . . ”).
4. See, e.g., ERIC V. LARSON & BOGDAN SAVYCH, RAND CORPORATION, MG-231-A,
AMERICAN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS FROM MOGADISHU TO BAGHDAD 1
(2005), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG231.html [hereinafter
LARSON & SAVYCH, MOGADISHU TO BAGHDAD]:
While anecdotal evidence suggests that public opinion is not a dominant factor in
decisions on whether or not to undertake military operations, there is ample
evidence that the public opinion environment shapes the way military operations
are justified and even, in some cases, the way they are designed and conducted.
5. See ERIC V. LARSON, RAND CORPORATION, MR-726-RC, CASUALTIES AND
CONSENSUS: THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF CASUALTIES IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR U.S.
MILITARY OPERATIONS iii (1996), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_
reports/MR726.html [hereinafter LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS]:
The relationship between U.S. casualties and public opinion on military operations
remains an important yet greatly misunderstood issue. It is now an article of faith
in political and media circles that the American public will no longer accept
casualties in U.S. military operations and that casualties inexorably lead to
irresistible calls for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces.
6. LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at xv. It is not uncommon
for government officials to justify military engagements to the public through statements that
“no ground troops” will be used. In fact, the lack of committed ground forces may explain
why the public remains largely unconcerned about brief, surgical insertions, such as the
nation’s current military involvement in Libya. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
has affirmatively pledged that there will not be any U.S. ground forces sent to Libya “”See
Gates: No U.S. Ground Troops in Libya on His Watch, USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2011-03-31-gates-mullen-libya_N.htm.
7. LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that “the rate of
decline [in support] as a function of casualties varies dramatically from operation to
operation.”). As discussed below, there is also the perception of a counter-conventional
reaction – a form of inflammation – in which fatalities lead to a demand for escalation (or
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This article asserts that this stark and monolithic metric requires reexamination in light of a little-known phenomenon: On the modern
battlefield, contractor personnel are dying at rates similar to – and at times
in excess of – soldiers. As their role in governance and defense expands,
contractors increasingly experience risks to their health and well-being. The
post-millennial U.S. military, like the modern U.S. government, is more
heterogeneous than ever before. In every conceivable aspect of missions
abroad, the U.S. military is populated by a “blended workforce” that
integrates soldiers with private-sector contractors – comprised of both U.S.
citizens and foreign nationals. Not surprisingly, one result of this
integration is that contractors are dying alongside – or in the place of –
soldiers at unprecedented and (arguably) alarming rates. For the most part,
this “substitution” has taken place beyond the cognizance of the public and,
potentially, Congress.9 This article examines this phenomenon, identifies
some of the challenges and complexities associated with quantifying and
qualifying casualty rates in this modern outsourced military, and
encourages greater transparency10 so that the public can more meaningfully
participate11 in democratic debate, “the great American experiment.”12
greater resolve) to achieve victory. Id. at 53.
8. See Christopher Gelpi et al., Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in
Iraq, 30 INT’L SEC., no. 3, 2006, at 7, available at http://www.mitpress journals.org/doi/
pdf/10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.7 (indicating that “[s]ince the Vietnam War, policymakers have
worried that the U.S. public will support military operations only if the human costs of the
war, as measured in combat casualties, are minimal.”).
9. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 753-757
(2010). Professor Michaels addresses the political benefits of relying on a large contractor
presence:
Private contractors are politically valuable insofar as they neither enter into official
head or body counts – nor, it appears, into our hearts. That is to say, the nation
identifies with its troops to a far greater extent than its contractors: “Americans are
accustomed to hearing the military death toll. But largely absent from the public
consciousness are the thousands of civilians putting their lives on the line as
contractors in Iraq.” Combining US military personnel and contractors in combat
zones thus allows for contractors to lighten the troops’ share of long tours, injuries,
and other physical and emotional hardships. But even more importantly, the
aggregate loss of life (and quality of life) is discounted by the fact that we neither
hear as much about nor, evidently, care as much about homesick or fallen
contractors.
Id. at 754-755 (quoting Marego Athans, To Make A Living, Driver Risked It All, BALT. SUN
1A (Feb. 8, 2004).
10. Since early in his Administration, President Barack Obama has emphasized the
linkage between transparency and the government’s accountability to the public. See
Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act, 1 PUB. PAPERS 4 (Jan. 21, 2009) (“A
democracy requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency. As Justice
Louis Brandeis wrote, ‘sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.’”).
11. LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR & PEACE 104-105 (2011). Dickinson
introduces her chapter on “Public Participation/Private Contract” by explaining, among other
things, that:
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II. A MODERN, UNANTICIPATED ROLE FOR CONTRACTORS
In past decades, enlisted personnel cut grass, peeled potatoes, and
carried out most defense services. Today, with a smaller allvolunteer force, many of these services are now contracted out.13
The extraordinary growth in the government’s reliance on service
contractors in the last two decades is well documented,14 and the
outsourcing phenomenon has generated scholarly debate about the
Public participation has long been a central preoccupation of administrative
law. . . . [M]uch of domestic administrative law is concerned with increasing
public awareness, participation, and oversight through . . . the Freedom of
Information Act. . . , the Federal Advisory Committee Act, inspector-general
oversight, whistleblower protection statutes, . . . notice and comment rule making,
judicial review . . . , and even the First Amendment. Significantly, . . . public
participation is not simply about making sure a voting polity ratifies all
government decisions. Rather, [public participation] is concerned with ensuring
that there is some sort of dialogue, even if informal, between the government and
the governed to act as a check on power. . . . In this scheme, transparency is . . .
an end in itself and . . . [it] helps to maintain a feedback loop between government
actors and those affected by government policy. . . .
Id. at 105-106 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). See also Cary Coglianese et al.,
Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process:
Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 927 (2009)
(“Not only will transparency and public participation inevitably help to achieve democratic
goals, but they also can help produce better, more informed policy decisions.”); Cary
Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational
Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 335 (2004) (pointing out to
the government the Sunshine Act’s declaration that “the policy of the United States [is] that
the public is entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding the decision-making
processes of the Federal Government” (quoting Pub. L. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §552b (2000)))).
12. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835).
13. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH., AND LOGISTICS,
REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON IMPROVEMENTS TO SERVICES
CONTRACTING 31 (2011), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2011-05Services.pdf [hereinafter IMPROVEMENTS TO SERVICE CONTRACTING].
14. Steven L. Schooner & Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors?
Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance, J. OF CONT. MGMT. 10 (2008); see also
PHILLIP J. COOPER, GOVERNING BY CONTRACT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC
MANAGERS (2003); MARKET BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE, AND
DOWNSIDE (John D. Donahue & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002); THE PROCUREMENT
REVOLUTION (Mark A. Abramson & Roland S. Harris III eds., 2003) (particularly chapters 1,
3, and 5-7); Collin D. Swan, Note, Dead Letter Prohibitions and Policy Failures: Applying
Government Ethics Standards to Personal Service Contractors, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (noting that service contractors are increasingly performing functions
that are indistinguishable from those performed by their federal counterparts). Symposia
have grappled with a host of related issues. See, e.g., Accountability and Democracy in the
Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1319 (2001); New Forms of Governance:
Ceding Power to Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002); Privatization and
Outsourcing, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 551 (2001); Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003).
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implications for governments and governance.15 According to the recent
report by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) DefenseIndustrial Initiatives Group, the professional services contracting industry
that serves the federal government has expanded at a rate of five percent
annually over the last fifteen years, from $137 billion in 1994 to $280
billion in 2009.16 The Department of Defense (DoD) remains the largest
federal government consumer of professional services, having spent over
15. Scholars also have exposed more of the thorny issues implicated when
governments, at the federal, state, and local levels, rely on the private sector. See, e.g.,
Roger Fairfax, Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits of Criminal Justice
Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 266 (“[T]he prosecutorial function . . . is being
outsourced to private lawyers in smaller jurisdictions . . . and [t]his phenomenon is poised to
expand as larger jurisdictions are forced to slash already tight law enforcement budgets.”)
Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2000) (discussing
accountability mechanisms in contracts and the conflict between public law norms and
private law principles); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367, 1371 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law’s current approach to privatization is
fundamentally inadequate in an era of increasingly privatized government.”); Sydney A.
Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003) (noting that
governments employ a transaction cost or make-or-buy analysis in determining whether to
outsource governmental regulation); Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services:
Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 130 (2003) (“[I]n the debate about
which government services are best-suited for private enterprise, . . . welfare services should
be among the last in line. The policy goals are simply too complex and, in a democratic
society, conflicted.”). A wealth of contemporary comparative scholarship also examines
lessons learned from experiences outside the United States. See, e.g., Lauren Page
Ambinder et al., The Mirage Becomes Reality: Privatization and Project Finance
Developments in the Middle East Power Market, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029 (2001);
Alessandro Ancarani, The Impact of Public Firms Commercialisation on Purchasing
Management, 3 J. PUB. PROCUREMENT 357 (2003); Bernard Black et al., Russian
Privatization & Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000);
Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market: Legislating on Privatization and Subcontracting, 60
MD. L. REV. 249, 249 n.a1 (2001) (see author’s biographical footnote for sources relating to
privatization in New Zealand); Hester Lessard, The Empire of the Lone Mother: Parental
Rights, Child Welfare Law, and State Restructuring, 39 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 717 (2001);
Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Prospect for Further Energy Privatization in Mexico, 36 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 75 (2001); Tony Prosser, Public Service Law: Privatization’s Unexpected
Offspring, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2000); Yua Wei, Corporatization and
Privatization: A Chinese Perspective, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 219 (2002). The newlyreformed Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) issued a Final
Recommendation on June 17, 2011, calling for the Federal Acquisition Regulatory (FAR)
Council to promulgate language that addresses the increasing risk of personal conflicts of
interest among service contractors. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-3, COMPLIANCE STANDARDS FOR GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES – PERSONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND USE OF CERTAIN NONPUBLIC INFORMATION 12-13 (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/research/theconference-current-projects/government-contractor-ethics/.
16. GREGORY SANDERS ET AL., CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, STRUCTURE
AND DYNAMICS OF THE U.S. FEDERAL PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INDUSTRIAL BASE 1995-2009
at ix (2010), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/101112_fps_report_2010.pdf. All
dollar values in this report were converted to FY 2009 dollars. See id. at 3.
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$162 billion on service contracts in 2009.17 One major consequence of this
expansion is that federal government contractors are now heavily involved
in our nation’s operations abroad.18 There may be no more significant
indicator of the scope of this involvement than the frequency with which
contractor personnel are now being asked to make the ultimate sacrifice in
what, until recently, would have been described as “the battle area.”19
17. Id. at 8. According to the Defense Science Board Task Force:
Contracts for services are essential to all aspects of military operations.
Contracted services to support Department of Defense (DOD) missions range from
routine base operating support to highly skilled analysis to direct support to
battlefield operations. Contracts for services supporting major DOD programs and
their associated administrative, technological, and logistics services are a strategic
component of the expanding expeditionary military, stability, and reconstruction
operations. The reduction in the number of uniformed personnel in the 1990s, and
today’s demanding combat missions have resulted in the expansion of services
contracting to more than $200 billion – over 50 percent of the DOD acquisition
budget. Today, almost every defense task that is not an inherently governmental
function is carried out in some part through contracted services.
IMPROVEMENTS TO SERVICE CONTRACTING, supra note 13, at vii (emphasis added).
18. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFG., AT WHAT RISK?
CORRECTING OVER-RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 7 (2011),
available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_InterimReport2-lowres.pdf
[hereinafter COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?] (quoting the
Commission on Wartime Contracting in its description of the “wide range of services” that
contractors perform: “They guard bases and diplomatic facilities, escort convoys and
personnel, wash clothes and serve meals, maintain equipment and translate local languages,
erect buildings and dig wells, and support many other important activities.”). See also
COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 18-19. The
CENTCOM census has grouped the contractor community into the following categories:
base support, security, communication, construction, translator/interpreter, logistics/
maintenance, transportation, training, and “other.” See Moshe Schwartz & Joyprada Swain,
Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis
(Cong. Research Serv. R40764), May 13, 1011, at 13-15, 24-25, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf.
19. Modern engagements and the use of non-traditional military forces in the past
decade have blurred the geographical limits of the “battlefield.” As a result, fatalities are no
longer conveniently confined to specific geographical areas. In fact, the diffuse nature of the
modern battlefield is a major focus in recent scholarship on the United States’ War on
Terror. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2117 (2005) (“Two controversial issues
about the detention power as it applies to terrorists concern the geographic scope of the
authorized conflict and the allowable length of detention for captured enemy combatants.”).
Sophia Brill, The National Security Court We Already Have, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 525,
536 (2010);“”. We make no attempt in this piece to distinguish between “war” and military
conflicts on the “battlefield.” The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are not “wars”
in the legal sense, as they lack of a formal declaration of war by Congress. See U.S. Const.
art. 1 §8(11). Thus, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which applied, “[in] time
of war, [to] persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field,” 10 U.S.C.
§802(a)(10) (2000), originally could not be applied to military contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan in the absence of a Congressional war declaration. See Michael J. Davidson,
Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated with Civilian Contractors on the
Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 239 (2000). In an attempt to overcome this
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On the modern battlefield, the ratio of troops to contractors has never
been lower. While the number of contractors employed by the military has
varied from conflict to conflict, historically, the ratio of contractors to
troops averaged around one-to-six.20 The last decade witnessed the U.S.
government’s first sustained operations where contractors consistently
outnumbered troops in the battle space (with the exception of the
engagement in Bosnia in the mid-1990s).21 What separates the current
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan from previous wars is the sheer
pervasiveness of contractors.22 While hard data remains elusive, most
experts concede that, in recent years, up to 200,000 contractor personnel
have supported the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan at any given time, a
number that frequently exceeded military personnel.23 Correspondingly,
evidence indicates that contractor fatalities on the battlefield have never
been higher.
As the military assigns more contractors to perform dangerous-yet-vital
tasks, contractors are inevitably bearing a larger portion of the casualty rate.
Cumulatively, contractor deaths account for nearly thirty percent of total
losses since the United States entered Iraq and Afghanistan.24 But even that
dramatic figure understates the extent to which – in the last two-to-three
years – contractors have increasingly absorbed the most significant cost of
our military actions. By continuing to outsource high-risk jobs that were
previously performed by soldiers, the military, in effect, is privatizing the
ultimate sacrifice.
Of course, we do not mean to assert, nor do we assume, that the
government is intentionally exploiting this substitution effect25 to its
jurisdictional problem, Congress amended the UCMJ in 2006 by replacing “war” with
“declared war or a contingency operation.” John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, §552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006) (codified
as amended at 10 U.S.C. §802(a)(10) (2006)).
20. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFG., AT WHAT COST?
CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 20-22 (2009), available at
http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_Interim_Report_At_What_Cost_06-1009.pdf [hereinafter COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT COST?].
21. See id.
22. See id. Of course, a number of other variables undoubtedly influence the
pervasiveness of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the prolonged length and
simultaneity of the conflicts, weak international support, and declining enlistment numbers
in the U.S. military.
23. See id.; SCHWARTZ & SWAIN, supra note 18, at 5-6; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. CENTCOM AREA OF
RESPONSIBILITY, IRAQ, AND AFGHANISTAN (2010), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/
PS/hot_topics.html.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
25. According to economic theory, the “substitution effect” is the relationship between
a drop in price of a good and a buyer’s decision to buy more of that good relative to other
higher-priced goods. In essence, price changes induce the buyer to purchase lower-priced
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advantage. Nothing suggests that senior military planners conspired to use
contractors on the battlefield as a means of reducing the troop casualty rate.
At the same time, this will not prove a fleeting experience. Nothing
indicates that DoD will be able to reduce its reliance on contractors in the
near future. On the contrary, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates
recently announced plans to reduce the number of Army and Marine ground
forces by as many as 27,000 troops within the next three years.26 On
February 1, 2011, Army Secretary John M. McHugh suspended the Army’s
current effort to in-source work from contractors and subjected all future
insourcing proposals to rigorous review.27 Neither will the Department of
State reduce its reliance on contractors. In the summer of 2010, the State
Department came under fire for awarding a $120 million contract to Xe
Services – formerly, Blackwater – after the high-profile Nissour Square
incident prompted the company’s expulsion from Iraq.28 As the State
Department prepared to take over the U.S. reconstruction effort in Iraq,
James F. Jeffery, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, testified in early 2011 that he

goods as a “substitute” for higher-priced goods. See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR
LAWYERS 23 (2005). For the purposes of this article, we suggest that the increase in
contractor (or surrogate) deaths – which, for a host of reasons, fall outside of the public’s
cognizance – decreases the “price” of war-fighting, in terms of military deaths, thus
distorting (or “increasing”) public support for contingency operations.
26. Karen Parrish, DOD Directs Army, Marine Drawdowns for 2015, 2016, American
Forces Press Service (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.
aspx?ID=62355.
27. Memorandum from John M. McHugh, Sec’y of the Army, on Reservation of InSourcing Approval Authority (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.govexec.
com/pdfs/020311rb2.pdf:
[E]ffective the date of this directive, I reserve to myself the authority to approve
any in-sourcing proposal, wherever generated across the Army. Any in-sourcing
proposal presented for my consideration must be fully documented and justified.
Any proposal will include, at minimum, a manpower requirements determination,
an analysis of all potential alternatives to the establishment of permanent civilian
authorizations to perform the contracted work, certification of fund availability and
a comprehensive legal review.
28. See Jeff Stein, Blackwater Deal Puts Officials on Hot Seat, WASH. POST (June 21,
2010:
6:40PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/06/blackwater_deal_
puts_officials.html. During that same summer, the Central Intelligence Agency also
awarded up to $600 million in contracts to Blackwater subsidiaries. See James Risen &
Mark Mazzeti, 30 False Fronts Won Contracts for Blackwater, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world/middleeast/04blackwater.html.
That the
government is still awarding contracts to a company with a severely damaged public
reputation indicates that the government is either incredibly tone-deaf to public perception or
highly dependent on contractors. The D.C. Circuit, in a unanimous decision issued in April
2011, reinstated criminal suits against four Blackwater employees involved in the September
2007 Nissour Square shootings. See United States v. Slough, 641 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir.
2011). The District Court judge, Ricardo M. Urbina, had previously dismissed the
indictments on the grounds that the defendants’ statements to Diplomatic Security were
compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Slough, 677 F. Supp.
2d 112, 133 (D.D.C. 2009).
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expected his staff to more than double in size within the coming year, from
8,000 to 17,000 people; most of that personnel growth will be contractors.29
This solidifies the assumption that the government’s reliance on
contractor support – both logistical personnel and private security
contractors – in contingency settings will continue to increase over the
long-term. In other words, contractor personnel will continue to die
supporting the government’s missions abroad and, more specifically,
performing tasks that, a generation ago, were performed by members of the
military. This article, therefore, seeks to examine how this continued
dependence on contractors affects the public’s sensitivity to wartime
casualties.
III. CASUALTY SENSITIVITY AND PUBLIC CHOICE
All of this matters because of the idea, inherent in our democratic
notions of governance, that public support (or public consent) is critical to
any successful military action abroad.30 Democratic institutions, such as
“public opinion, public debate, rallies, and protests” force our
democratically-elected “leaders [to] either convince the public of the
necessity of using force or abide by public worries about its costs: in lives,
financial resources, or opportunities.”31
For 40 years, policy makers and scholars have widely accepted the
theory that public support for any given military conflict is inversely related
to the number of U.S. military casualties suffered in that conflict.
Economists may not perceive this as rational behavior,32 but the public does

29. See Walter Pincus, Top Diplomat Defends Size, Cost of State Dept. Presence in
Iraq, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/02/01/AR2011020106176.html; Iraq: The Challenging Transition to a Civilian
Mission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement
of James F. Jeffrey, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Jeffrey-Austin_Testimony.pdf.
30. But see LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 2 (acknowledging
that “there . . . are profound differences in beliefs about how representative democracy
works, specifically the extent to which American political leaders influence, or follow, the
will of the public.”). See also DICKINSON, supra note 11, at 104-105. We agree with the
proposition that “importing public participation norms into a world of private contracts is an
underexplored avenue for imposing accountability and constraint.” Id. at 143.
31. Deborah Avant & Lee Sigelman, Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from
the U.S. in Iraq, 19 SECURITY STUDIES 230, 236-237 (2010) (citing ROBERT A. DAHL,
POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971); IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE:
A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795)).
Indeed, Avant and Sigelman note that Kant
distinguished himself from Machiavelli by suggesting that “[b]y involving citizens in
decisions about war, republics based on freedom, law, and equality could exercise greater
caution and sometimes avoid the calamities of war.” Id. at 239-240.
32. “The concern about casualties among political leaders and the public, although
humane, is not entirely rational – U.S. battle deaths are actually somewhat rare, typically
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not always behave in entirely rational ways.33 John E. Mueller persuasively
demonstrated this theory in his 1973 book, War, Presidents and Public
Opinion, by analyzing opinion polls for the Vietnam and Korean Wars in
connection with their respective casualty rates.34 More broadly, “in
democracies[,] the standards for using force are said to be higher than
elsewhere: war must be of great importance to warrant spilling the blood of
citizens fighting for their country and to subject democratic leaders to
political consequences when casualties mount.”35 Research suggests that,
without a clearly defined national imperative for a military operation or a
general belief in the likelihood of that operation’s success, military
casualties can greatly influence the public’s support for, or opposition to,
that operation.36
The RAND Corporation’s Eric V. Larson, who chronicles public
opinion polls of military operations, explained that “all else being equal,
prospective and observed support for a U.S. military intervention [declines]
as expected or actual casualties increase.”37 But the calculus is more
complex, and, the most hyperbolic positions may lack empirical support.
Larson identifies “[t]wo bits of conflicting conventional wisdom[:]”
The first, . . . more commonly expressed . . . in the national security
community, has it that, as casualties mount, the public will
“demand” immediate withdrawal, i.e., U.S. casualties result in an
inexorable demand to withdraw precipitously from . . . military
commitment. The counter-conventional wisdom has it that U.S.
casualties . . . inflame the American public, resulting in a “demand”
very few, and are dwarfed by the number of deaths to U.S. service personnel from other
causes.” LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 6 (footnotes omitted).
33. The common assumption held by most economists is that individuals behave
rationally, at least to some degree. See, e.g., JOHN P. BURKETT, MICROECONOMICS:
OPTIMIZATION, EXPERIMENTS, AND BEHAVIOR 3 (2006). A recent strain of popular economic
literature is examining some any number of theoretical economic assumptions in common,
everyday scenarios, often with entertaining, if not enlightening results. See, e.g., STEVEN D.
LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS (2005); STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J.
DUBNER, SUPERFREAKONOMICS (2009). See also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL
(2008).
34. See JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR PRESIDENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1973). Like most
significant research, Mueller’s work is frequently summarized and over-simplified. See
Gelpi, supra note 8, at 11 (“Mueller’s finding does not support the casualty-phobia thesis.
However, Mueller was arguing that public support dropped reflexively, and more to the
point, inexorably. His oft-quoted study thus fixed in the public mind the idea that support
for Vietnam buckled as the body bag toll mounted, and this gradually hardened into the
conventional wisdom that the public is reflexively casualty phobic.”).
35. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 255 (citing MUELLER, supra note 34).
36. See LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 10-12.
37. Id. at 7. One of our colleagues, an Army Judge Advocate, reminded us that, of
course, things are never really equal. Accordingly, this effect is not static, and “[s]upport for
a U.S. military intervention rarely remains at its initial levels and tends to fall over time (and
as casualties increase).” Id. at xix.
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for escalation to a “decisive victory.” . . . [N]either of these extreme
views is accurate.38
Nor, Larson implies, are military casualties the only variable affecting
public support for military operations. Extrapolating from available public
opinion data from the last several decades, Larson outlined several
additional predictors that significantly affect public support, including: (1)
the importance of the stakes; (2) prospects of success; and (3) partisan
leadership and “followership.”39 Taking these factors together, Larson
ultimately concluded that, as the public’s belief in the importance of the
operation and its prospects for success increased, the more tolerant the
public became of casualties and other costs.40
This theory has proved accurate over time and, more recently, when
applied to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.41 Mueller has argued that
public support for the war in Iraq has generally followed the same steady
decline as witnessed in Korea and Vietnam.42 As the administration shifted
its focus away from Iraq, savage violence and a mounting death toll in
Afghanistan are souring public support. While the events of September 11,
2001 helped to establish a strong national imperative for these operations,
the public’s belief in their likely success has slowly, but steadily, dwindled.
“[T]he characteristics of the sort of war we are waging in the [Global War
on Terror] – mostly in the shadows, with only occasional evidence of
success – make it a significant challenge to sustain public optimism about
the outcome.”43 Larson and Begdan Savych caution that “if most
38. Id. (footnotes omitted).
39. Id. For an alternative rubric, see Gelpi, supra note 8, at 14-16. Gelpi examines a
number of conditions – many of which can co-exist – under which the number of casualties
will cause public support to decline more rapidly: (1) Gelpi cites Bruce Jentleson for the
proposition that the “pretty prudent” public bases its casualty tolerance on the articulated
“principal policy objective (PPO)” and asserts greater public acceptance of “foreign policy
restraint” (FPR) goals. Id. at 14. (2) Gelpi discusses Eric Larson’s research in the context of
an “elite casualty tolerance.” Id. at 15. Here, he summarizes that: “when domestic elites are
divided, even a small number of casualties will quickly diminish public support.” Id. (3)
Gelpi references Steven Kull for the proposition that the engagement of other states matters,
implying that multilateral support either suggests that a rationale underlies the engagement
or that the burdens of the military action are being evenly (or even fairly) distributed. Id.
Finally, Gelpi and his co-authors point to the public’s expectations for success. “When the
public thinks victory is unlikely, even small costs will cause support to plummet.” Id. at 1516.
40. See LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5.
41. “[T]here has been a great deal of continuity and consistency in the public’s
response to casualties in wars – including World War II and the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf
Wars – and in smaller operations – including Panama and Somalia.” Id. at iv.
42. John Mueller, The Iraq Syndrome, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2005, at 44. For a
critique of this article by Christopher Gelpi, a political science professor at Duke University,
followed by a reply from Mueller, see Gelpi & Mueller, supra note 1.
43. LARSON & SAVYCH, MOGADISHU TO BAGHDAD, supra note 4, at xxiv. See also
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Americans were to come to believe that the stakes in Iraq were no more
important than those in the peace operations of the 1990s, for example, or
that the situation closely resembled the quagmires of Vietnam, Lebanon,
and Somalia, remaining support and the willingness to accept casualties
could quickly erode.”44
IV. LAYERS OF COMPLEXITY: DILUTING A SIMPLE NUMBER
Unfortunately, the raw number of military casualties no longer tells the
whole story of human sacrifice associated with military actions. As the
battlefield becomes more complex, it becomes increasingly more difficult to
discern and provide an accurate tally of the human cost of war; that is, the
number of troop fatalities can no longer capture the true human cost of
these operations.45
For example, in 2004, the New England Journal of Medicine reported
that advances in Kevlar, body armor, and medevac operations have reduced
military deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan to about ten percent of total
injuries.46 While that is remarkable, the resulting increase in veterans
surviving with multiple amputations, brain trauma, devastating burns, and
other severe injuries has achieved less public attention.47 This development
has created a whole new set of analytical challenges that government
programs48 and non-profits, like the Wounded Warrior Project,49 have been
Gelpi, supra note 8, at 25 (“We argue that survey respondents’ tolerance for casualties in the
war in Iraq is a function of two central explanatory variables: (1) the extent to which they
believe that President Bush did the right thing in attacking Iraq, and (2) the extent to which
they believe that the United States will emerge victorious.”).
44. LARSON & SAVYCH, MOGADISHU TO BAGHDAD, supra note 4, at xxiv-xxv
(emphasis added).
45. While the modern battlefield has certainly become safer for some, it is still
incredibly dangerous for others. See infra notes 67 & 68. Technological advances have also
enabled the U.S. military to better protect certain warfighters from harm. See, e.g., Peter W.
Singer, A Revolution Once More: Unmanned Systems and the Middle East, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/11_robotic_
revolution_singer.aspx. Nevertheless, the modern battlefield is still a very dangerous place.
46. Atul Gawande, Casualties of War – Military Care for the Wounded from Iraq and
Afghanistan, 351 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2471 (2004), available at http://www.nejm.org/
doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp048317.
47. For a particularly sobering account, see DAVID FINKEL, THE GOOD SOLDIERS
(2009). The author, a Washington Post writer, chronicles the deployment of an infantry
battalion during “the Surge” in Baghdad during 2007 and 2008, offering, among other
things, a window into the medical experiences, rehabilitation, and the future prospects for
some of the injured survivors.
48. For example, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs received from Congress a
budget of $48 billion in 2010 to provide medical services to veterans. See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, POTENTIAL COST OF VETERANS’ HEALTH CARE 2 (October 2010), available
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11811/2010_10_7_VA Healthcare_Summary.pdf.
49. See About Us, WOUNDED WARRIOR PROJECT, http://www.woundedwarrior
project.org/content/view/1135/.
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working to resolve. Unfortunately, neither the government nor the media
have afforded the same level of attention to the deaths and injuries of
contractors who have suffered in support of the nation’s war efforts.50
By analogy, consider similar research in the homicide context, which
suggests that the steady decrease in homicide rates over the last few decades
may be due more to advances in emergency medical technology than to an
actual reduction in violent crime.51 Accordingly, “[t]he relative rarity of
homicides, and the fact that they are made even more rare by medical
intervention, may make homicide data alone a less reliable vehicle for
studying etiology and prevention than the combination of homicides and
assaults.”52
This conclusion directly applies in the wartime context, as military
fatalities alone have become a less reliable vehicle for examining the total
human cost of war.
A massive contractor presence permits the
Administration to suggest, and the public to believe, that our military
presence on the ground is smaller – by as much as half – than what is
actually required to accomplish the mission. Even as President Obama took
steps to officially end combat operations and withdraw troops in Iraq, he
made no representation that there would be a proportionate decrease in
contractor staffing; in fact, Ambassador Jeffries’s testimony regarding the
State Department’s preparations to continue the reconstruction efforts in
Iraq clearly indicated that additional contractors will be required to fill the
void.53
This implicates the broader outsourcing trend, which we do not attempt
to chronicle here.54 Suffice it to say that government contractors are
50. For a sobering series of articles on the numerous issues facing wounded
contractors, see T. Christian Miller, Disposable Army: Civilian Contractors in Iraq &
Afghanistan, PROPUBLICA.COM, http://www.propublica.org/series/disposable-army.
Of
course, we commend the New York Times prominently discussing issuesar relating to the
risks facing contractors in Afghanistan. See Rod Nordland, War’s Risks Shift to Contractors,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at A1; infra text accompanying notes Error! Bookmark not
defined.-163.
51. See Anthony R. Harris et al., Murder and Medicine: The Lethality of Criminal
Assault 1960-1999, 6 HOMICIDE STUD. 128, 130 (2002).
52. Id. at 156.
53. See Pincus, supra note 29.
54. As Paul Light explained in his book The True Size of Government, despite a
generation of bipartisan efforts to portray a “small government” to the public, government
mandates continue to increase, leaving agencies no choice but to increasingly rely upon
contractors to provide mission-critical services. See PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF
GOVERNMENT (1999). The most recent iteration of constant reform in this arena is intended
“to assist agency officers and employees in ensuring that only Federal employees perform
work that is inherently governmental or otherwise needs to be reserved to the public sector.”
Publication of the Officer of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01,
Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56227, 56236
(Sept. 12, 2011).
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gaining a greater presence on the battlefield because the government
increasingly depends on the private sector to sustain our war, intelligence,
and homeland security efforts.55 Contractors are employed more than ever
in critical support positions, such as gathering intelligence, maintaining
weapons, providing static and mobile security, training troops, and handling
interrogations.56 Using contractors generally,57 as well as in more specific
contingency operations, can have significant benefits.58 But today’s
55. Congressional and executive leadership wonder whether we have become too
dependent upon contractors. The Obama administration has embarked upon an aggressive
effort to redefine those functions that are inherently governmental and, in effect, “insource”
resources with an eye towards restoring government capacity to perform these important
functions. See Memorandum on Government Contracting, 1 PUB. PAPERS 180 (Mar. 4,
2009). If the Administration makes good on these promises – granted, an unlikely scenario –
this will reverse an aggressive outsourcing trend that spanned the 16 years of the predecessor
Clinton and Bush administrations. As indicated, passim, any momentum such an initiative
may have had appears to have dissipated. Indeed, the current pervasiveness of contractors in
Iraq and Afghanistan will have significant strategic implications for future conflicts. See
T.X. Hammes, Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic
Impact, JOINT FORCE Q., Jan. 2011, at 26, 34 (“The size and type of force that we build for
the future depend on a clear concept of how the United States plans to use contractors, both
armed and unarmed, in present and future conflicts.”).
56. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT COST?, supra note 20, at 2022 (2009); Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised
Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549
(2005). On August 11, 2011, DoD issued a final rule establishing policy and procedures “for
the regulation of the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel
performing private security functions under a covered contract.” Private Security
Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Combat Operations or Other
Significant Military Operations, 76 Fed. Reg. 49650, 49655 (Aug. 11, 2011). This rule also
establishes policy on incident reporting and rules for the appropriate use of force. Id. For a
discussion of the modern deputizing trend in homeland security and intelligence, see Jon D.
Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1435 (2010); Jon D. Michaels, All
the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96
CAL. L. REV. 901 (2008).
57. See IMPROVEMENTS TO SERVICE CONTRACTING, supra note 13, at 11 (noting that
using contractors provides the government with “the ability to tailor efforts more easily to
available budgets[,]” “provides access to expertise developed outside of government
contracting[,]” and allows for “performance improvements [to be] well-documented when
work is completed[.]”).
58. According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting, deploying contractors in a
contingency operation can yield numerous benefits. The Commission suggests that, among
other things, contractors can:
▪ Offer skills and experience that government agencies lack or possess only to a
limited extent;
▪ Free up military personnel for combat or other critical missions;
▪ Reduce the need to hire and train new federal civilian employees;
▪ Provide flexibility in expanding and reducing support personnel quickly and as
needed;
▪ Be more cost-effective for performing certain support functions; and
▪ Provide jobs and training opportunities to local nationals in keeping with
economic development or counter-insurgency policies.
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military cannot effectively fight or sustain itself without an enormous,
highly integrated contractor presence.59 Ashton B. Carter, the current
Deputy Secretary of Defense and former Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, testified before the Commission on
Wartime Contracting that the exigencies of war and the difficulties of doing
business locally in Afghanistan may have contributed to “the unaccustomed
need to have so many contractors support our contingency operations,
though by now this should be recognized as a phenomenon that’s here to
stay and should not be unaccustomed.”60
The outsourcing of military responsibilities is not limited to DoD. It
extends well into other agencies, such as the Department of State, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of
Homeland Security.61 Both the State Department and USAID employ a
burgeoning cadre of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan that often work
beside DoD contractors and personnel.
For example, Blackwater
Worldwide began its private security operations in Iraq in 2004 under the
State Department’s global security services contract.62 Therefore, it is
important to keep in mind that contractor fatalities are not limited to DoD
contractors.
The ubiquity of government contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan
correlates with the disturbing increase in contractor fatalities. The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) recently reported that private
security contractors are four times more likely to be killed in Afghanistan
than uniformed personnel.63 But these deaths are by no means limited to

COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 18.
59. According to Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter, “Contract management
continues to be one of the Department’s top priorities, both at home and in a contingency
environment. . . . Another key is having the right quantity and quality of people under them.
Resourcing has been – and continues to be – a challenge for the Department.” Test. of
Ashton B. Carter, Under Sec’y of Def. for Acquisitition, Tech. & Logistics, before the
Comm’n on Wartime Contracting: Better Buying Power in Defense Spending 4-5 (Mar. 28,
2011), available at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/hearing2011-03-28_testimonyCarter.pdf.
60. Testimony of Ashton B. Carter, supra note 2, at 3.
61. See Schooner & Greenspahn, supra note 14, at 10; Schooner, Contractor
Atrocities, supra note 56, at 3-6; COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT, supra
note 2, at 20 (stating that “[t]he number of contractors and grantee employees supporting
State and USAID in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly exceeds the agencies’ employees—18 to 1
for State, and 100 to 1 for USAID.”)
62. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 7 (2008), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf.
63. Moshe Schwartz, The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security
Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress
(Cong. Res. Service R40835), Feb. 21, 2011, at 12. There are many reasons for this
disparity. There are likely to be differences in the levels of professional training and
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arms-bearing contractors. Data from 2008 “show that the chances of
humanitarian aid workers dying by violence were almost six times those of
U.S. police officers,”64 and anecdotal evidence indicates that truck driving
remains the most dangerous job in these regions.65
Against this backdrop, we sense that high contractor casualties produce
a substitution effect that artificially reduces the public’s perception of the
human cost of our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan – quantified by some
exclusively as soldier casualties. As the U.S. government increases its use
of contractors in contingency operations, it simultaneously reduces the
number of tasks completed by military personnel.66 In addition to
outsourcing jobs that were previously performed by soldiers, the
government is outsourcing the physical risks of injury and death associated
with those jobs, resulting in fewer military casualties.
Sadly, the media rarely mention contractor fatalities, and it is uncertain
how aware the public is of these disturbing trends.67 While military
available equipment between public military soldiers and private contractors. See, e.g., infra
note 141.
64. M.A. Thomas, It’s Dangerous Out There, AM. INT., Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 56, 57,
available at http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=888 (“Unlike police
officers, however, few aid workers have any training or equipment for self-protection;
indeed, many are deeply conflicted about whether and how to protect themselves.”). As this
article aptly states: “[T]his is not your parents’ aid work. What today’s idealistic young
people are not told is that . . . foreign aid work has become a high-risk occupation. . . . While
data on aid worker mortality is poor, the data . . . suggests that if aid were a domestic U.S.
industry, aid work would follow deep-sea fishing and logging as the third or fourth most
dangerous occupation.” Id. at 56.
65. In a single, high-profile example, an attack on a convoy left six men dead, eleven
seriously wounded, and one missing and presumed dead. See Fisher v. Halliburton, Inc., 454
F. Supp. 2d 637, 639 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
66. Indeed, in today’s foreign policy environment, NGOs have been recast “as a ‘soft
power’ tool of U.S. foreign policy, a ‘force multiplier’ for U.S. combat forces and a valuable
source of military intelligence.” Id. at 58. This “poses a particular problem for NGOs that
see themselves as humanitarians adhering to the principles articulated by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Id. Perhaps most importantly:
While some NGOs are fighting to maintain distinctions between combatants and
aid workers, . . . these boundaries are collapsing and are likely beyond resurrection
in a new era of warfare. With so many actors engaged in similar tasks – soldiers,
military contractors, civilian government aid workers, civilian aid workers
embedded in military units, development contractors, development contractors
owned by military contractors, development NGOs, humanitarian NGOs, multimandated NGOs . . . , NGOs who are also government contractors – it would be
difficult for even conscientious combatants to tell who would be entitled to
protected status without the help of . . . lawyers and accountants. The targeted
attacks on aid workers suggest that insurgents are not even interested in attempting
to draw this difficult distinction, nor are terrorists . . . .
Id. at 60.
67. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 260 (“Unprompted, nine of the ten
interviewees asked something to the effect of ‘is this true?’ They then went on to say they
had no idea contractors were being used this way in Iraq and expressed great surprise that
non-U.S. citizens were serving under contracts with [private military and security
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“[c]asualty figures are routinely collected and released” to the public,
“[t]here is no such coordinated or automatic diffusion of information about
contractors, nor are there triggers to alert the media.”68 The media,
therefore, fails to fulfill a critical role in this context; it neither informs the
public nor fosters debate amongst policy-makers.
The media report debates among leaders and experts to members of
the public, who consider and discuss them.
The media
subsequently poll these same members of the public, informing
leaders of the success of their persuasive arguments. While
something of a simplification, this captures some of the most
important features of how the democratic conversation works.69
This conversation – involving policy-makers and the public and facilitated
by the media – is critical to informed decision-making.70 An accurate tally
of contractor casualties is important to fully assess the military’s reliance on
outsourcing and how that might affect military casualties in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and with it, the public’s overall casualty sensitivity.
V. OUTSOURCING CASUALTIES: QUANTIFYING THE SUBSTITUTION
Before we begin parsing the carnage, some clarification and caveats
may be in order. Our data compares the volume of military deaths – the
deaths of members of the armed services – to contractor deaths. For the
purposes of this discussion, we attempt to track and depict only what
appears to be a mounting substitution of contractor fatalities for military
losses. Our quantification makes no attempt to represent the universe of
suffering as a result of the U.S. military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Specifically, we do not attempt to quantify enemy combatants or civilian
companies].”).
68. Id. at 245 (“The ratio of coverage of [private military security contractors] to the
military was . . . very low.”). Avant & Sigelman ultimately found a 1/27 ratio in the amount
of contractor coverage over the amount of military coverage in the St. Louis Times Dispatch
and a 1/47 ratio in the New York Times. See id.
69. LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 96-97.
70. Id. at xxiii (emphasis added):
The historical record suggests that the public’s tolerance for casualties and its
support for U.S. wars and military operations will continue to be based upon a
sensible assessment of normative and pragmatic considerations, more fully
informed by leaders. When such an assessment leads to broad recognition that
important interests are engaged, important principles are being promoted, and the
prospects for success are high, the majority of the American public is likely to
accept costs that are commensurably high with the perceived stakes. . . . [I]n the
end, most Americans do not want lives to be sacrificed for any but the most
compelling and promising causes, and they look to their leaders to illuminate just
how compelling and promising the causes are.

DEAD CONTRACTORS [POST] (DO NOT DELETE)

18

JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY

4/4/2012 3:46 PM

[Vol. 5:N

(Iraqi or Afghani) deaths. Nor does the data include the deaths of coalition
forces, those members of the militaries of states allied in support of the U.S.
military missions.71 Similarly, we neither track nor include fatalities
amongst contractors working for other states or governments. We also do
not include non-military/non-contractor U.S. civilian deaths, such as
fatalities amongst non-uniform employees of the U.S. Department of State,
the Agency for International Development, or the various Defense
Department agencies. Finally, we make no effort to distinguish contractors
based upon which U.S. agency or department they serve or, more broadly,
the task that they perform or the skill sets they bring to bear.72 To the extent
that more data has recently become publicly available, the data still includes
significant gaps and reflects wild fluctuations.73 Again, our endeavor here
71. One Army Judge Advocate suggested:
[Our] sliding scale fails to address another layer of complexity – foreign soldiers
themselves. A key component to [our] mission in Afghanistan is to turn over
security to the Afghans. Missions are conducted jointly; Afghan units are graded
on their ability to perform independent of /along with /under close supervision of
our troops. . . .[T]he US is paying for not only Afghan equipment but also most of
the ANSF salaries. . . . [To the extent that] we are training, equipping and,
basically paying the salary of, an Afghan soldier, where does he . . . fall?
Email (Apr. 10, 2011) (on file with author).
72. As others have articulated, contractors perform a wide range of services in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other hotspots. Among other things, the never ending list of tasks and
specialties includes: accounting and audit services; construction; cultural anthropology;
custodial services in offices and housing units; electrical, plumbing, and HVAC (heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning); food service; flying planes and helicopters; information
technology; intelligence gathering and analysis; health care; interpretation and translation;
laundry; management and supervision; mobile security (e.g., protecting high-value targets,
such as Members of Congress, and escorting convoys); oil pipeline repair, maintenance, and
management; static security (guarding enclosed bases, diplomatic facilities, depots, etc.);
training; truck driving; and weapon systems maintenance. See COMM’N ON WARTIME
CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 18; COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL
REPORT, supra note 2; but see SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 12 (describing a higher fatality
rate for arms-bearing contractors). According to a March 2011Congressional Research
Service (CRS) report, base support represents, by far, the largest category. Construction
accounted for the second largest group until the dramatic decline in construction during
2009. Security now accounts for the second largest group. We do not believe, however, that
this data necessarily reflects the contractor population over the course of the last 8-10 years.
73. The CENTCOM census began breaking out logistics/maintenance and training in
the first quarter of 2010. See SCHWARTZ & SWAIN, supra note 18, at 13-15, 24-25. We
discourage researchers from drawing conclusions from the static and short-term data
depicted in the CRS report. For example, (1) the short-term snapshots reflect wild
fluctuations within service sectors (e.g., construction personnel, dropping from 29,937 to
2,171 in a two-year period); and (2) the “other” category, for the quarter ending March 2008,
included more than 20,000 contractor personnel. Moreover, Iraq and Afghanistan present
different scenarios. “DOD does not report the breakdown of services that contractors provide
in Afghanistan, with the exception of data on private security contractors. Nevertheless, the
types of services provided by contractors in Afghanistan are similar to those conducted in
Iraq, including logistics, construction, linguistic services, and transportation; the percentage
of contractors providing each service is likely different. DOD officials have stated in the past
that they will start providing data on the breakdown of services in Afghanistan. However, to
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is limited to surrogacy. While we realize that our data, and hence the
comparisons we draw from that data, are imperfect,74 we have attempted to
be fully transparent as to the limited data upon which we rely.
The best available data on contractor fatalities comes from the
Department of Labor’s Division of Longshore and Harbor Worker
Compensation, which tracks contractor injuries and deaths based upon
insurance claims submitted under the Defense Base Act (DBA).75 Under
the DBA, employers are required to report to the Labor Department
compensable employee injuries and deaths within ten days of becoming
aware of the incident.76
According to this data, more than 2,600 contractors have been killed in
Iraq and Afghanistan (in addition to another sixty-two contractors killed in
Kuwait) between 2001 and the end of 2011.77 Another 58,000 contractors
have been injured, more than 22,000 at least somewhat seriously (see
Figure 2).78 While these numbers were slow to accumulate, Figure 1
reflects the startling fact that contractor deaths now represent nearly thirty
date, they have not done so.” Id. at 10. The CRS report also explains that “[t]he percentage
of private security contractors operating in Iraq is different that of those operating in
Afghanistan.” Id. at 10 n.35.
74. The Defense Science Board recently attempted to articulate the scope of this
problem, ultimately recommending the need for a new taxonomy for services:
Given the concerns over data quality, [the] eight “portfolio groups” used by the
DOD to track services are particularly troubling. While these groupings may make
semantic sense, they are not appropriate to determine guidance and policy. The
“knowledge-based services” portfolio group, as an example, inappropriately
combines routine education and training contracts with expeditionary logistics
management contracts. This portfolio group is overly vague and cannot provide
meaningful analysis of performance insights.
IMPROVEMENTS TO SERVICE CONTRACTING, supra note 13, at 6.
75. The DBA applies the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (2006), “in respect to the injury or death of any
employee engaged in any employment . . . under a contract entered into with the United
States. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §1651(a) (2006). The DBA provisions also apply to foreign nationals
employed by U.S. contractors and “shall be [compensated] in the same amount as provided
for [U.S.] residents.” 42 U.S.C. §1652(b) (2006).
76. 33 U.S.C. §930(a) (2006).
77. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (DLHWC) (Dec. 31, 2010), available at http://www.dol.
gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm. Year-by-year data on contractor casualties from before
2009 was obtained by a Freedom of Information Act request and is on file with the authors.
78. Globally, a total of 2,620 DBA claims for civilian contractor deaths, and 68,869
DBA claims for civilian contractor injuries, have been filed since Sept. 2001. See id. It goes
without saying that the majority of these claims came from contractors who worked in Iraq
and Afghanistan. See also Contractor Casualties on the Rise According to the DOL’s Latest
DBA Figures, OVERSEAS CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS (Jan. 11, 2011), available at
http://civiliancontractors.wordpress.com/2011/01/11/contractor-casualties-on-the-riseaccording-to-the-dols-latest-dba-figures/.
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percent of U.S. fatalities since the beginning of these wars.79

FIGURE 1
TOTAL FATALITIES
2001 - 2011
Contractors
(2,655)

US Troops
(6,323)

FIGURE 2
CONTRACTOR INJURIES
2001 – 201180
Iraq
Afghanistan
Total

Serious Injuries
16,290
6,202
22,492

Total Injuries
44,606
13,467
58,073

Certain firms have been particularly hard hit. Eighty-two contracting
firms have lost at least seven employees since 2001.81 Other companies

79. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77; Military Casualty
Information, DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER (Dec. 31, 2010), available at
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm.
80. Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77.
81. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Employer, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/
dbaallemployer.htm. The total number of companies suffering contractor deaths is
unknown, as the DOL applies the Rule of 7: “If an employer has fewer than seven cases in
any Case Type category, the actual number of cases is not shown. However, the numbers
are counted toward the total at the bottom of the report.” About the Defense Base Act Case
Summary Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION,
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have suffered far more severely; thirty-two companies have lost more than
twenty employees, eleven companies have lost more than fifty employees,
and six companies have experienced more than eighty deaths.82 As Figure 3
demonstrates, L-3 Communications suffered the most of any company,
having lost 373 employees since 2001.83 It is important to understand that
not all of the data can be fully reconciled, particularly at the margins. For
example, the information on losses within individual firms is not expressly
limited to contractor deaths occurring in the Middle East. Nonetheless, we
believe it accurately reflects the trends, to the extent that over ninety
percent of the total number of deaths reported to DOL occurred in Iraq,
Afghanistan, or Kuwait.84

DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, available at
http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsaboutdbareports.htm.
82. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Employer, supra note 81.
83. See id. This number includes L-3 Communications’ subsidiaries, MPRI (which
lost 10 employees), Titan Corporation (which lost 324 employees), and TLOTS1 (which lost
32 employees). .Id.
84. As of March 31, 2011, a total of 2,620 deaths have been filed through the DBA.
See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77. Of those, 2,350 occurred in
Iraq, Afghanistan, or Kuwait, and 75 were labeled as “Nation Pending.” See id. Four
insurance carriers have covered the majority of these claims: Insurance Company of the
State of Pennsylvania; Continental Casualty Company; ACE American Insurance Company;
and Zurich American Insurance Company, and 111 claims were filed through an uninsured
employer. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Carrier, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/
dbaallcarrier.htm.
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FIGURE 3
CONTRACTOR FATALITIES BY EMPLOYER
2001 – 201185
Employer
L-3 Communications (including subsidiaries
MPRI; Titan Corp.; TLOTS1)
The Supreme Group (including subsidiary
Supreme Food Service)

Fatalities

Compass Security

163

Service Employees International

127

DynCorp International (including subsidiary
DynCorp Technical Services)
AEGIS (including subsidiaries Aegis Defense
Service; Mission Essential Personnel)

373
241

101
89

Additional complexities are created by the difficulties in distinguishing
prime contractors and subcontractors – distinctions not made in the DBA
data – and we make no effort here to do so. For example, Kellogg, Brown,
and Root (KBR) stated in 2008 that it had lost at least 122 employees, but it
included subcontractor deaths in this count.86 While the exact relationship
between prime contractors and subcontractors is obviously quite opaque, it
is worth noting that the DBA applies to subcontractors.87 As a result,
subcontractor fatalities are included in the DBA’s overall count.
Predictably, the overall carnage has been greater in Iraq, where more
than 1,560 contractors, about a quarter of the overall U.S. death toll in that
country, have died since 2003 (see Figure 4). By comparison, in
Afghanistan, the 1,095 dead contractors represent nearly forty percent of
U.S. deaths in that country.

85. See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Employer, supra note 81.
86. Steven L. Schooner, Why Contractor Fatalities Matter, 38 PARAMETERS 78, 87
(2008) (“KBR reports that, through July 2008, in addition to 87 ‘hostile fatalities,’ its
employees suffered 22 vehicular fatalities, 13 workplace fatalities, and approximately 850
‘hostile injuries’ in the Middle East.” (citing KBR Middle East Region – Casualty Summary:
January 2003 – July 2008 (on file with author))).
87. See 42 U.S.C. §1651(a) (2006).
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FIGURE 4
TOTAL FATALITIES
2001 – 2011
Iraq
Afghanistan
Total

US Troops88
4,474
1,849
6,323

Contractors89
1,560
1,095
2,655

While the enormity of contractor sacrifice gives pause, what is even
more striking is that – in both Iraq and Afghanistan – contractors are
bearing an increasing proportion – annually and cumulatively – of the
death toll. DBA fatality claims by contractors in 2003 represented only
four percent of all fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan. From 2004 to 2007,
that number rose to twenty-seven percent. From 2008 to the end of 2010,
DBA fatality claims accounted for an eye-popping forty percent of the
combined annual death toll. In 2010 and 2011, contractor fatality claims
represented nearly half (forty-seven and forty-eight percent, respectively) of
all fatalities.
The situation in Iraq mirrors this proportional trend. While the number
of military deaths stayed relatively constant between 2004 and 2007, the
number of contractor deaths steadily increased. Contractor fatalities
represented only five percent of the annual death toll in 2003, but quickly
exceeded twenty percent in 2004, and reached thirty-six percent in 2008.
Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate that contractor deaths actually surpassed
military deaths in 2009 and 2010, although the carnage in 2010 was less
than half of what it was in 2009 (see Figure 7). Over the past three years,
more U.S. contractors have been killed in Iraq than U.S. military soldiers.
This is not surprising, given the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces and the
official completion of Operation Iraqi Freedom. As the U.S. military’s
focus shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, a plethora of contractors remain in
Iraq to continue the reconstruction effort.

88.
89.

Military Casualty Information, supra note 79.
Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77.
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FIGURE 5
PERCENT BREAKDOWN OF FATALITIES IN IRAQ
2003 - 2011
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FIGURE 6
IRAQ FATALITIES
2009 – 201190
Contractors

277

US Troops

262

FIGURE 7
FATALITIES IN IRAQ
2003 - 2011
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90. Military Casualty Information, supra note 79; Defense Base Act Case Summary by
Nation, supra note 77.
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FIGURE 8
PERCENT BREAKDOWN OF FATALITIES IN
AFGHANISTAN
2001 - 2011
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In Afghanistan, the trend accelerated late in the decade. From 2005 to
2008, contractor fatalities represented only twenty to thirty percent of the
death toll. That percentage, however, rose in recent years; contractor deaths
represented thirty-six percent of all U.S. fatalities in 2009, forty-six percent
of U.S. fatalities in 2010, and forty-eight percent of U.S. facilities in 2011
(see Figure 8).91 More than eighty-six percent of all contractor fatalities in
Afghanistan occurred between 2009 and 2011. From the beginning of the
Afghanistan war to the end of 2009, a total of 289 contractors and 936
military troops were killed. Since 2010, more than 806 contractors and 913
military troops were killed (see Figure 9). This makes 2010 and 2011 the
most dangerous period on record in Afghanistan for both contractors and
U.S. troops (see Figure 10). Indeed, the future of the Afghanistan war
remains far from clear. Ambassadors Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas
Pickering have questioned the success of the U.S. counterinsurgency and its
ability to eradicate the Taliban through military force.92
91. Contractor deaths reportedly outpaced U.S. military fatalities in the first half of
2010. From January to June, 232 contractor deaths and 195 troop fatalities were reported.
See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77; Military Casualty
Information, supra note 79. See also Steven L. Schooner & Collin D. Swan, Contractors
and the Ultimate Sacrifice, SERVICE CONTRACTOR 16, 17 (2010) (addressing the rise in
contractor fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan through June 2010). In the second half of 2010,
however, over 304 U.S. troops were killed, compared with only 188 contractor deaths. See
Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77; Military Casualty Information,
supra note 79.
92. Lakhdar Brahimi & Thomas R. Pickering, Settling the Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES,
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FIGURE 9
AFGHANISTAN FATALITIES
2010 – 201193
Contractors

806

US Troops

913

FIGURE 10
FATALITIES IN AFGHANISTAN
2001 - 2011
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Mar. 23, 2011, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CEE
DD1231F930A15750C0A9679D8B63&ref=afghanistan.
Ambassadors Brahimi and
Pickering state that “[e]fforts by the Afghan government, the United States and their allies to
win over insurgents and co-opt Taliban leaders into joining the Kabul regime are unlikely to
end the conflict.” Id. If the United States is to succeed in its Afghanistan mission, according
to Brahimi and Pickering, it needs to start considering the possibility of negotiated
settlement. See id. (“The United States has been holding back from direct negotiations,
hoping the ground war will shift decisively in its favor. But we believe the best moment to
start the process toward reconciliation is now, while force levels are near their peak.”).
93. Military Casualty Information, supra note 79; Defense Base Act Case Summary by
Nation, supra note 77.
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VI. AN IMPERFECT PICTURE: UNDER-REPRESENTATIVE DATA
The lack of publicly available data on contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan creates additional complexities. Traditionally, the data derived
from DBA insurance claims was not publicly available and could only be
obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests.94 Only recently has
the Labor Department begun publishing much of this information on its
website, a positive step in increasing the public’s awareness of contractor
casualties.95
Unfortunately, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently
confirmed that there are numerous problems associated with this data,
which likely under-represents the total number of contractor deaths and
injuries.96 The Labor Department’s database was not designed for this
task;97 rather, Labor only designed its database to compile the number and
type of insurance claims filed under the DBA and not to track the actual
deaths and injuries of contractor personnel.98 As such, “Labor officials . . .
explained that not all deaths and injuries reported under DBA would be
regarded as contractors killed or wounded within the context of the”
statutory mandate.99 The DBA database only reflects a contractor’s death
when the family or employer files a claim for insurance compensation,
which does not always occur immediately after the incident giving rise to
the claim, assuming a claim is filed at all.100 The DBA data also fails to
track the deaths and injuries of personnel working under non-contract
assistance instruments (i.e., grants) because these instruments are not

94. Schooner, Why Contractor Fatalities Matter, supra note 86, at 86.
95. This website may be found at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm.
See Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, supra note 77. See also Schooner & Swan,
supra note 91, at 17.
96. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-1, IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN:
DOD, STATE, AND USAID FACE CONTINUED CHALLENGES IN TRACKING CONTRACTS,
ASSISTANCE INSTRUMENTS, AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL 24-25 (2010).
97. According to a GAO report:
Labor’s DBA case data do not provide an appropriate basis for determining the
number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan while
working on DOD, State, or USAID contracts . . . Labor – unlike DOD, State, and
USAID – has no responsibilities for tracking killed or wounded contractor
personnel, and as such, its data were not designed to do so. . .
Additionally, because Labor does not track cases by agency or contract, DBA data
cannot be analyzed to determine how many cases involved contractor personnel
working specifically on DOD, State, or USAID contracts. . .
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1, CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: DOD,
STATE, AND USAID CONTINUE TO FACE CHALLENGES IN TRACKING CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL
AND CONTRACTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 17-18 (2009).
98. Id. at 24.
99. Id. at 25 (referencing the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
Year (FY) 2008).
100. Id. at 35 n.33.
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subject to the DBA.101
The Inspector General of the Department of Labor expressed further
concern about the efficiency and accuracy of the DBA claims process.102
Specifically, the Inspector General estimated that around sixty-eight percent
of employers fail to report employee injuries in a timely manner.103
Additionally, administrative problems exist due to the antiquity of the
DBA, which “was enacted during World War II [and] has not been
modified or adequately staffed to take into consideration the current use of
contractors and foreign nationals in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
the rapid increase in DBA cases that have resulted from these wars.”104
Language and literacy barriers also present a serious challenge to
ensuring that foreign contractors and their employees fully understand their
rights and responsibilities under the DBA.105 Accordingly, the actual
number of contractor fatalities is probably higher than currently known,
particularly with respect to local hires and third country contractors.106 It is
also possible that the recent upward trends are more indicative of efforts by
Labor officials to improve the DBA claims process and ensure compliance
by contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, efforts have recently
been made to clarify when DBA insurance requirements apply, educate
contractors on their rights under the DBA, and translate insurance
information into Arabic.107
Contemplating the data from the standpoint of specific agencies, most,
including the defense agencies, initially made little or no effort to keep

101.
102.

Id.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 02-11-001-04-430, OWCP
NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS MONITORING AND MANAGING OF DEFENSE BASE ACT CLAIMS 2-4
(2011), available at http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/oa/2011/03-11-001-04-430.pdf.
103. Id. at 6-7 (Labor officials “recognized that delays in reporting injuries – especially
for foreign workers arising from remote war zones – are endemic, and DBA employers have
great difficulty in meeting the 10-day requirement to submit injury reports to OWCP.”).
104. Id.
105. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-280R, DEFENSE BASE ACT
INSURANCE: REVIEW NEEDED OF COST AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 5 (2005); see also
COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 31 (“[C]ontractor
deaths are undoubtedly higher than the reported total because federal statistics are based on
filed insurance claims, and many foreign contractors’ employees may be unaware of their
insurance rights and therefore unlikely to file for compensation.”).
106. For example, the War Hazards Compensation Act specifically excludes coverage
“in the case of any person (1) whom residence is at or in the vicinity of the place of his
employment, and (2) who is not living there solely by virtue of the exigencies of his
employment, unless his injury or death resulting from injury occurs or his detention begins
while in the course of his employment. . . .” War Hazards Compensation Act §101(d), ch.
668, 56 Stat. 1028, 1030 (1942) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1701(d) (2006)).
107. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-772T, DEFENSE CONTRACTING:
PROGRESS MADE IN IMPLEMENTING DEFENSE BASE ACT REQUIREMENTS, BUT COMPLETE
INFORMATION ON COSTS IS LACKING 5 (2008).
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track of how many contractors they employed in Iraq and Afghanistan,
much less the number of contractors killed or wounded.108 Only recently
has Congress mandated that the Pentagon, the State Department, and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) track how many
contractors are working in Iraq and Afghanistan and how many have been
killed and wounded. In response to a 2008 Congressional mandate, DoD
created the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)
to track information on contingency contractor operations, including
contractor casualties.109 DoD concedes, however, and GAO confirms, that
SPOT remains an inadequate source of data on this critical information.110
108. Coordination between the various agencies in theater merely exacerbates the
problem. ”[D]uring the first several years of the [Iraq] conflict, the DOD did not even have
the ability to count and keep track of contractors from the Department of State, and as
recently as February of 2008 had still not fully entered the State Department contractors into
the DOD tracking database.” DICKINSON, supra note 11, at 59 (citing An Uneasy
Relationship: U.S. Reliance on Private Security Firms in Overseas Operations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’tal Affairs 6 (2008) (statement of Jack Bell,
Deputy Under Sec’y of Def. for Logistics and Materiel Readiness)).
109. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
§861, 122 Stat. 3, 253-254 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §2302 Note). For additional
information on SPOT, see Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker Enterprise
Suite (SPOT ES), www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/docs/SPOT_ES_Overview_Oct_2010
_SPOT_101_Releasable.pptx. This DoD presentation introduces SPOT as: “A single, joint
enterprise system on a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) employed for: the management,
tracking and visibility of contractors accompanying U.S. forces overseas and contingency
operations[;] capturing movement and location information about operating forces,
government civil servants, and government contractors in specified operational theaters[;]
and providing dynamic, ad hoc reporting by putting the power of data reporting and analysis
in the hands of the analyst.” Id. The NGO community has raised concerns with regard to
SPOT. Specifically:
SPOT. . . threatens to undermine NGO effectiveness, humanitarian worker safety,
and NGO’s ability to work in partnership with . . . civilian branch agencies . . . in
areas of the world that are of vital national interest and where NGOs have a
comparative advantage on the ground in terms of relating to local populations...
SPOT. . . requires a far more detailed level of personal information on program
staff than mandated by the legislation. . . .[T]he categories of information required
under SPOT were not developed with host country nationals in mind and may be
impossible to obtain and update regularly. . . .
[A]s the system is owned . . . by DoD with its contents subject to interagency
information-sharing and intelligence gathering. . . , the decision to use SPOT failed
to consider some significant implications for, and special challenges to, U.S.
NGOs who are dedicated to working as neutral actors . . . SPOT . . . blurs the
distinction between civilian led humanitarian and development activities and U.S.
military operations and creates a perception that NGOs are closely associated with
the military and U.S. intelligence forces.
INTERACTION, SYNCHRONIZED PRE-DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONAL TRACKER (SPOT) FACT
SHEET, June 1, 2010, available at http://www.charityandsecurity.org/system/files/
Synchronized%20Pre.pdf.
110. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-1, supra note 98, at 7. A recent
GAO report concluded that, “while SPOT has the ability to reflect the number of personnel
killed or wounded, contractors are not routinely using this function and therefore the data are
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Basically, DoD, by far the largest contracting agency in Iraq and
Afghanistan, has not even seriously begun to track contractor deaths and
injuries.111 It is difficult to understand this failure, given the existing
statutory, regulatory, and contractual mandates regarding compliance. For
most relevant contracts to be performed outside the United States, the
government’s contracting officer is required to use a standard, remedygranting clause.112 The required clause contains exhaustive warnings and
requirements.113 The DoD’s regulatory guidance114 and the DoD version of
unreliable.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-886, IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN:
DOD, STATE, AND USAID CANNOT FULLY ACCOUNT FOR CONTRACTS, ASSISTANCE
INSTRUMENTS, AND ASSOCIATED PERSONNEL 9 (2011). The report also stated that “SPOT still
cannot be used to reliably track statutorily required contract, assistance instrument, and
personnel data as agreed to in the agencies’ [Memorandum of Understanding] because of a
number of longstanding practical and technical limitations.” Id. at 22.
111. Id. Thus the problem is not merely keeping track of dead contractors; the
government continues to struggle to keep track of live, working contractors:
Since the beginning of the Iraqi conflict, none of the agencies that have hired . . .
contractors could give Congress an accurate account of the total number of
contractors hired or deployed . . . [T]he 2008 Defense Authorization Act
mandated that . . . DOD . . . take charge of counting contractors, but as recently as
2009, many years into the Iraqi operation, the government still had no accurate
system even to track how many of its own private contractors are in the country.
In addition, when a firm working . . . with DOD hires a [sub]contractor . . . , the
agency does not consistently include those subcontractors in its tally.
DICKINSON, supra note 11, at 108 (citing GAO-10-1, supra note 97, at 8-15).
112. 48 C.F.R. §52.225-19. The clause is required for contracts to be performed: “In a
designated operational area during – (1) Contingency operations; (2) Humanitarian or
peacekeeping operations; or (3) Other military operations or military exercises, when
designated by the combatant commander; or When supporting [certain] diplomatic or
consular mission[s.]” See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. §25.301-4(a) to (b).
113. In addition to providing guidance on pre-deployment training, visas, wearing of
uniforms, the right to carry weapons and other things, the clause – Contractor Personnel in a
Designated Operational Area or Supporting a Diplomatic or Consular Mission Outside the
United States (Mar 2008), 48 C.F.R. §52.225-19 (emphasis added) – makes clear that:
“Contract performance may require work in dangerous or austere conditions.
Except as otherwise provided in the contract, the Contractor accepts the risks
associated with required contract performance in such operations.” 48 C.F.R.
§52.225-19(b)(2).
“Unless personnel data requirements are otherwise specified in the contract,
the Contractor shall establish and maintain with the designated Government
official a current list of all Contractor personnel in the areas of performance.
The Contracting Officer will inform the Contractor of the Government official
designated to receive this data and the appropriate system to use for this effort.
[Also, t]he Contractor shall ensure that all employees on this list have a current
record of emergency data, for notification of next of kin, on file with both the
Contractor and the designated Government official.”
48 C.F.R. §52.22519(g)(1) to (2).
“In the case of isolated, missing, detained, captured or abducted Contractor
personnel, the Government will assist in personnel recovery actions. . . .
Personnel recovery may occur through military action, action by non-
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the clause115 both specifically require use of the SPOT database.
Only the State Department and USAID have initiated meaningful
efforts to track the deaths and injuries of their contractors.116 During FY
2009, and the first half of FY 2010, the State Department reported that nine
of its contractors died and sixty-eight were wounded, while USAID
reported 116 of its contractors were killed and 121 were wounded.117 These
numbers, however, were self-reported by contractors, and GAO cautioned
that “[w]ithout alternative sources of data, [it] could not verify whether
State’s and USAID’s data were complete . . . . [Additionally,] a recent
report from the USAID Inspector General suggested that not all security
contractors in Afghanistan are reporting . . . personnel being injured or
killed.”118

governmental organizations, other Government-approved action, diplomatic
initiatives, or through any combination of these options.” 48 C.F.R. §52.22519(m)(1) to (2).
“The Contractor shall be responsible for notification of the employeedesignated next of kin, and notification . . . to the U.S. Consul . . . if the
employee – (i) Dies; (ii) Requires evacuation due to an injury; or (iii) Is isolated,
missing, detained, captured, or abducted.” 48 C.F.R. §52.225-19(n)(1) to (2).
114. The DoD FAR supplement also requires that, “[w]hen using the clause at FAR
52.225-19, the contracting officer shall inform the contractor that the Synchronized
Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) is the appropriate automated system to use
for the list of contractor personnel required by paragraph (g) of the clause.” 48 C.F.R.
§225.301-4(2).
115. The DoD acquisition regulations supplement this clause and specifically provide:
The Contractor shall enter before deployment and maintain data for all Contractor
personnel that are authorized to accompany U.S. Armed Forces deployed outside the
United States as specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this clause. The Contractor shall
use the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) web-based
system, at http://www.dod.mil/bta/products/spot.html, to enter and maintain the
data. . . . The Contractor shall ensure that all employees in the database have a
current DD Form 93, Record of Emergency Data Card, on file with both the
Contractor and the designated Government official. . . .
48 C.F.R. §252.225-7040(g)(1) to (2).
116. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-1, supra note 98, at 23. See also
OFFICE OF ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE, AAPD 10-04, ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY
DIRECTIVE (2010), available at http://www.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities/
cib/pdf/aapd10_04.pdf. In the background section, the AAPD indicates: “The [current
version of the] MOU [between DoD, State, and AID] . . . specifies that SPOT will include
information on contracts in Afghanistan with performance periods of more than 30 days or
valued at more than $100,000.” Id. We conclude from this that contractors killed in
Afghanistan while working on short-term (less than 30 days) or small (under $100,000)
contracts would not necessarily be included in SPOT. See, e.g., MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING (MOU) BETWEEN THE U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (DOS) AND THE U.S. DEP’T OF
DEFENSE (DOD) AND THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (USAID) RELATING TO CONTRACTING
IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2008), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/p_
vault/MOU_Signed_July2008.pdf.
117. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-1, supra note 98, at 23.
118. Id.
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VII. NUANCES: THE DEVIL IN THE DETAILS
Another unanswered question regarding the inadequacy of publicly
available data concerns the contractors’ cause of death. The GAO recently
examined a sample of DBA death claims that occurred between FY 2009
and the first half of FY 2010, and found that approximately half (forty-nine
percent) of these deaths were caused by non-hostile incidents.119 Broken
down by country, the GAO found that 62.4 percent of DBA death claims in
Iraq were caused by hostile incidents, compared with only 26.3 percent of
claims in Afghanistan. The GAO also found that over thirty percent of nonhostile deaths resulted from health conditions or illness. Again, the GAO’s
analysis must be read in the context of the small sample size (less than ten
percent of the total number of DBA cases) and unverifiable data, which
make it difficult to apply these conclusions to a wider field of contractors.120
Moreover, members of the military also die from heart attacks and
vehicle accidents, and DoD and the media count those deaths as military
fatalities.121 Through the end of 2011, the Washington Post’s “Faces of the
Fallen” has chronicled a total of 4,474 military deaths in Iraq and 1,849 in
Afghanistan.122 Cross-referencing this total with data from the Defense
Manpower Data Center’s Personnel and Procurement Statistics confirms
that the Washington Post’s numbers include 957 accidental deaths in Iraq
and 373 accidental deaths in Afghanistan.123 Figure 11 provides a clearer
view of this breakdown.

119. Id. at 26.
120. Id. at 25 n.33. The GAO examined only a sample of 213 DBA cases; those cases
were provided by Labor specifically for this purpose, and they are not publicly available.
121. We believe this is consistent with the historical approach to measuring battlefield
deaths. It is also one of the reasons we prefer the term “fatalities” as opposed to
“casualties.” For example, in the most exhaustive study on the topic, the author explained:
“Categories of casualties include battle deaths, non-battle deaths, wounded in action, and
prisoners of war (POWs). Unless otherwise elaborated, the word “casualties” refers to
deaths due to hostile action (or battle deaths) for the remainder of this report.” LARSON,
CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 7 n.2.
122. WASH. POST, Faces of the Fallen, (Jan. 9, 2011), available at http://projects.
washingtonpost.com/fallen/.
123. Military Casualty Information, supra note 79.
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FIGURE 11
MILITARY DEATHS BY TYPE
2001 – 2010124

Killed in Action
Accidental
Total

Iraq

Afghanistan

3,517
957
4,474

1,476
373
1,849

We concede that it would be worthwhile to conduct a more in-depth
analysis of contractor fatalities by, for example, cause of death. We would
not be surprised if, as the GAO’s data indicates, health-related issues for
contractors are higher than among military troops due to general
demographic differences (e.g., we assume the data would show a higher
median age for contractor personnel), the military’s more rigorous entrance
screening procedures, and ongoing military physical fitness requirements.
Consider, for example, that many U.S. military retirees have returned to
Iraq and Afghanistan as civilian contractors. Unfortunately, public access
to the required data remains limited.

124.

Military Casualty Information, supra note 79.
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VIII. FOREIGN AND LOCAL LABOR:
UNINTENDED EXTERNALITY, UNEXPECTED BENEFIT?
The source of labor also merits further examination. As a result of the
increased level of outsourcing in contingency operations, the government
has discovered a source of uniquely inexpensive labor in foreign nationals.
The CRS points out the well-accepted fact that foreign nationals work for
lower salaries than U.S. citizen contractors.125 Local Iraqis and Afghanis
are the cheapest to hire because of the dismal state of their war-torn
economies and the fact that their local status avoids transportation and
housing costs. Given the acknowledged pervasiveness of foreign nationals
in the U.S. contracting force, it is safe to assume that many of the U.S.
government contracting victims in Iraq and Afghanistan are locals and other
foreign nationals. This increased layering of complexity126 presents a
particularly problematic issue from a casualty sensitivity standpoint, as
public support for U.S. military operations may be (and, we intuit, probably
is) less influenced by non-U.S. casualties.127
Unfortunately, the Labor Department’s contractor death and injury
statistics do not distinguish by trade or nationality. Inferences, however,
125. SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 3. This is not to say that cost is the only justification
for contracting with foreign nationals. Indeed, such contracting “can provide economic
inputs to local economics by hiring locals to provide services. Creating jobs and stimulating
the economy are key aspects of population-centric counterinsurgency.” Hammes, supra note
23, at 29.
126. Consider a continuum, with either citizen conscripts (or draftees) or an allvolunteer army or militia at one extreme. See Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 241
(“The fact that citizens are required to give up their time, if not their lives, in service to the
country’s goals should increase the stake of citizens in those goals, enhancing participation.
It should ensure that citizens show an active interest in . . . the rules by which they are
conscripted.”). We sense, and the research suggests, that public perception of the military
changes as the combatants (or those killed in the battle area) progress across the continuum
spanning, for example, American military veteran/arms-bearing contractors, American law
enforcement veteran/arms-bearing contractors, American support contractors, foreign armsbearing contractors, foreign support contractors, etc.
127. Inferences to this effect can be drawn from research on the public’s sensitivity to
civilian casualties in U.S. military operations. See ERIC V. LARSON & BOGDAN SAVYCH,
RAND CORPORATION, MG-441-AF, MISFORTUNES OF WAR: PRESS AND PUBLIC REACTIONS TO
CIVILIAN DEATHS IN WARTIME 3 (2006), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
MG441.html (“Although it is sometimes argued that large numbers of civilian casualties
could reverse public support for U.S. military operations, this monograph will show that
Americans generally have not responded to high-profile incidents of civilian casualties
during U.S. military operations by withdrawing their support for the operation.” (emphasis
added)). Indeed, much of the survey research in this area has not contemplated this scenario.
See, e.g., LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 7-8 and Table 2.1 (citing
Americans Talk Security No. 9). In response to the question: “if you had to make a decision
about using the American military, how important would each of the following factors be to
you?”, 86 percent said that the “[n]umber of American lives that might be lost” was “very
important[.]” Id. (emphasis added).
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can be drawn from DoD’s census reports on its defense contracting
personnel, which DoD began releasing in the second half of 2007. While
the GAO has raised significant questions about the reliability and accuracy
of this data,128 the DoD quarterly census reports remain the only readilyavailable source for any national breakdown of contractor personnel
employed in the CENTCOM region. According to this data, in January
2011, approximately 77 percent of U.S. defense contractors in Afghanistan
were foreign nationals, and 68 percent of those were local Afghanis.129
Local Afghanis also comprised nearly 95 percent of DoD’s private security
contracting force in Afghanistan, although DoD cautioned that “validation
of [these] numbers is uncertain due to a rapidly changing environment
surrounding President Karzai’s Decree 62.”130 In Iraq, 72 percent of DoD’s
contracting force was foreign nationals, 20 percent of which were local
Iraqis.131
The U.S. Commission on Wartime Contracting, in its February 2011
Interim Report to Congress, provided a national breakdown of contractors
for Fiscal Year 2010 that expanded beyond DoD and included State
Department and USAID contractors, which is reproduced in Figure 12.132

128. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-19, CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING:
DOD, STATE, AND USAID CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN 25 (2008) (“The [CENTCOM] census relies on contractor firms to self-report
their personnel data. According to DOD officials, when they receive the data they review it
to ensure that there are no obvious errors, but they do not routinely evaluate the accuracy or
completeness of the reported data.”).
129. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CONTRACTOR SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE U.S.
CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, IRAQ, AND AFGHANISTAN (Jan. 2011), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/hot_topics.html [hereinafter DOD CONTRACTOR SUPPORT,
Jan. 2011]. It is worth noting that the numbers for Afghanistan were even higher not more
than six months prior to this report. In May 2010, 85 percent of U.S. defense contractors in
Afghanistan were foreign nationals, 81 percent of which were local Afghanis. Apparently,
DoD’s quarterly reports indicate that DoD eliminated over 70,000 contractor positions
between May and December of 2010. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, CONTRACTOR SUPPORT
OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE U.S. CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, IRAQ, AND
AFGHANISTAN (May 2010), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/hot_topics.html.
The Government Accountability Office, however, recently reported in September 2011 that
“the numbers for local nationals working under contracts in Afghanistan were generally
overreported . . . [due to] a methodological error [that] resulted in double counting of local
nationals in Afghanistan for the first three fiscal year 2010 quarters.” U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-886, supra note 11, at 12.
130. DOD CONTRACTOR SUPPORT, Jan. 2011, supra note 129.
131. Id.
132. See COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 18, at 7.
The Commission provided updated figures in its Final Report to Congress, which was issued
during the final editing stages of this article on August 31, 2011. See COMM’N ON WARTIME
CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 20.
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FIGURE 12
DEFENSE, STATE, AND USAID CONTRACTORS
133
IN IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN FISCAL YEAR 2010
Nationality

Dep’t of Defense
Contractor
Percent
Personnel
Total

Dep’t of State
Contractor
Percent
Personnel
Total

USAID
Contractor
Percent
Personnel
Total

Total
Contractor
Percent
Personnel
Total

U.S.
Nationals
Iraqi/Afghan
Nationals
ThirdCountry
Nationals
Unknown

41,855

28.9%

4,322

22.4%

805

2.3%

46,982

23.5%

44,890

31.0%

10,194

53.8%

32,621

91.2%

87,705

43.9%

57,960

40.0%

4,734

24.5%

1,193

3.3%

64,887

32.0%

– –-

– –-

60

0.3%

1,149

3.2%

1,209

0.6%

Total

144,705

100%

19,310

100%

35,768

100%

199,783

100%

On the whole, it appears that no more than twenty-four percent of U.S.
contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan are actually U.S. citizens.134
That figure, though, appears to have risen over the last couple of years,
suggesting that it might not be prudent to extrapolate too much from this
limited, volatile dataset.135
As an aside, third-country nationals, particularly in developing
countries and areas near battle zones, seem especially susceptible to forced
labor and human trafficking. Anecdotal reports identified problems
involving contractors operating on U.S. bases in Iraq and Afghanistan.136

133. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 58, at 7.
134. Id.
135. Indeed, In Iraq, between the fall of 2007 through the end of 2010, the relative
populations of DoD contractors have shifted (in decreasing order of magnitude) from: (1)
local nationals, (2) third-country nationals, and (3) U.S. citizens to (1) third-country
nationals, (2) U.S. citizens, and (3) local nationals. SCHWARTZ & SWAIN, supra note 18, at
17. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the proportion of DoD contractors that are U.S. citizens and
third-country nationals has gradually increased, while the percentage of contractors
represented by local nationals has decreased from eighty percent in 2008 to around fifty
percent at the end of 2010. Id. at 11.
136. In one recent example of human trafficking, twelve Nepalese men signed labor
contracts with Daoud & Partners Ltd., a Jordanian subcontractor in Iraq and Afghanistan
working under KBR, a major U.S. contractor. These men were under the assumption that
they were headed to Jordan to serve as hotel staff. Instead, their passports were seized and
they were shipped off to Iraq before being captured and executed by Iraqi insurgents. Jeff
Jeffrey, Justice for Contract Workers in America’s Wars, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (Jan. 3,
2011), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticlePrinterFriendlyNLJ.jsp?id=12024
76608072&slreturn=1.
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The exact scope of this reprehensible activity occurring in Iraq and
Afghanistan is, regrettably, still unknown.137
Foreign nationals are “cheaper” in a more pernicious sense. Hiring
non-Americans for dangerous jobs in Iraq and Afghanistan reduces the
innumerable risks constantly facing U.S. military personnel and helps to
reduce the number of U.S. military fatalities. Of course, the government is
well aware of the risks facing locals who serve as contractors supporting the
U.S. mission. Indeed, the State Department created a number of special
visa programs that allow certain contractor personnel to enter the United
States after their service.138 For a host of reasons, however, such programs
have not proven a panacea against the dangers.139
Furthermore, if the fatality rate among contractors has little effect on
public support, either because the public does not know or care about

137. For more information on the subject of human trafficking in Iraq and Afghanistan,
see INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, EVALUATION OF DOD CONTRACTS
REGARDING COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (2011),
available at http://www.dodig.mil/SPO/Reports/SPO-2011-002_508.pdf.
138. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006 authorized up to 50 Special
Immigrant Visas (SIV) annually for Iraqi and Afghani translators and interpreters working
for the U.S. military. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, §1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443-44 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101 note). In
2007, Congress expanded the number of authorized SIVs to 500 per year for FY 2007 and
FY 2008. See Act of June 15, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-36, §1, 121 Stat. 227, 227 (to be
codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101 note). Congress later made Iraqi and Afghan aliens holding SIVs
“eligible for resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and other benefits available to
refugees.” Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. G, tit. V,
§525, 121 Stat. 1844, 2212. Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY
2008 authorized up to 5,000 SIVs per year to Iraqi nationals who were employed by the
United States for at least one year, “provided faithful and valuable services to the United
States Government . . . [and have] experienced or [are] experiencing an ongoing serious
threat as a consequence of the alien’s employment by the United States Government.”
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, §1244, 122
Stat. 3, 397 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §1157 note). In 2009, Congress authorized the same
program for Afghanistan, setting aside up to 1,500 SIVs per year for Afghani nationals. See
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, div. F, tit. VI, §602, 123 Stat. 524,
807 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101 note).
139. See Jeff Stein, Iraqi Interpreters Seek Punishment of Contractor They Say Sexually
Harassed Them, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2011, at A1. This article describes the ordeal of
several Iraqi women who worked as translators and sought to obtain SIVs to enter the United
States:
The Iraqi women . . . had college educations and spoke English well enough to
work as interpreters with U.S. combat units, jobs that came with a high mortality
rate even off the battlefield: Insurgents targeted them for assassination as
collaborators. . . . Because of the lingering dangers for Iraqis who allied
themselves with the Americans, the State Department created a special visa to
allow interpreters and other workers into the United States. . . . After a brazen
kidnapping attempt by armed men in a Baghdad shopping arcade, [one of the
interpreters] fled to Europe. . . . “I had to leave Iraq because I faced death threat
many times . . . ,” she said by telephone. “They said because I worked with the
Americans, I betrayed my country . . . and I should be dead for that.”
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contractors, the government and the military have little incentive to
minimize contractor fatalities. This is particularly true to the extent that, as
a general rule, the military, the State Department, and USAID do not take
responsibility for providing security to their contractors.140 Thus, it is not
surprising that the military chose to prioritize the issuing of then-scarce
scarce body armor to soldiers before making it available to civilians.141 Yet
even when the supply of body armor met demand, the military was slow to
issue body armor to contractors or mandate its use.142 By hiring non-

140. For contracts performed outside of the United States, “contractors are responsible
for providing their own . . . security support, including . . . security support for their
employees.” 48 C.F.R. §25.301-2(a); 48 C.F.R. §52.225-19(c). The enormous (and
critically important) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract was the
primary exception to this policy in Iraq. According to testimony by Tina Ballard, the United
States Army Assistant Undersecretary for Procurement & Policy, before the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: “Contracts contain different provisions.
In the case of the LOGCAP contract, there was a specific provision that prohibited the use of
private security contractors.”
Iraqi Reconstruction: Reliance on Private Military
Contractors and Status Report: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform, 110th Cong. 185 (2007) (statement of Tina Ballard, Assistant Undersec’y for
Procurement & Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Army). Despite this provision, KBR appears to
have indirectly hired private security through its subcontractors. See id. at 112. This
discovery evolved and turned into a dramatic scandal regarding the reimbursement of the
costs of that security, fueled in part by the fact that Blackwater was one of the private
security firms hired by a KBR subcontractor, ESS Worldwide Services. See id. It is
interesting how little discussion there has been of what we view as the more pressing issue –
that the Army ultimately failed to perform its security commitment to protect KBR personnel
to such an extent that KBR felt the need to privately hire its own security. Nor have the
episodic media reports of contractor deaths resulted in a public outcry regarding the
government’s failure to ensure the safety of the people supporting the government’s
missions.
141. DoD did not make body armor available to contractors until months after all
military personnel in the region had already received access to body armor. Even when
supply was sufficient, DoD’s policy did not even prioritize, much less mandate, that body
armor be supplied to contractor personnel. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-275, DEFENSE LOGISTICS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF
CRITICAL ITEMS DURING CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS 75-81 (April 8, 2005)
(“Interceptor body armor was not available in sufficient quantities to U.S. military forces in
Iraq sometime between October 2002 and September 2004 . . . Because of the shortages,
many individuals bought body armor with personal funds . . . The new body armor was
initially intended for limited numbers of personnel, such as dismounted infantry, however,
this [later] changed . . . In May 2003, the Army changed the basis of issue to include every
soldier in Iraq. Then in October 2003, CENTCOM further expanded issuance of the body
armor to include all U.S. military and DOD civilian personnel . . . [in] Iraq, Kuwait, and
Afghanistan . . .”).
142. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-911T, DEFENSE
LOGISTICS: ARMY AND MARINE CORPS’ BODY ARMOR REQUIREMENTS, CONTROLS, AND
OTHER ISSUES 8 (2007). The GAO explained that:
DOD Instruction 3020.41 allows DOD to provide body armor to contractors where
permitted by applicable DOD instructions and military department regulations and
where specified under the terms of the contract. It is CENTCOM’s position that
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military personnel to perform high-risk tasks that were once considered
inherently governmental (and thus performed solely by military
personnel),143 the government is essentially substituting contractor deaths
that have little or no impact on the public’s casualty sensitivity.
We concede that further research is required to assess differences in
public reactions to military deaths, American contractor deaths, and foreign
contractor deaths. One study suggested that – with regard to private
military deaths – there was “little support for the contention that public
consent is affected by whether a soldier is serving or contracting, and
[interviews] did not even suggest that the nationality of the soldier
mattered.”144 As noted below, this conclusion is contrary to expectation and
anecdotal evidence. Moreover, the authors concede that: (1) at least one
interviewee (out of ten) felt better about the contractor fatalities, and (2)
others initially expressed similar sentiments but “changed their mind as
they continued to speak.”145
While it might be premature to conclude that substituting contractor
sacrifice for military losses directly affects public support for military
action, raising the question seems both rational and important.
[T]he general public may care more about the deaths of soldiers,
who are serving out of a sense of patriotic duty, than of
[contractors], who are motivated by profit. This possibility is
widely recognized in policy analyses of the private military and
security industry and is reflected in the expectations of policymakers. . . . The deaths of soldiers may communicate a message to
the public about the importance and legitimacy of a mission –
invoking symbols of sacrifice, patriotism, and national interest –
and about the importance of sticking it out to honor and validate the
commitment of those who have fallen. The deaths of [contractors] .
. . may elicit different feelings altogether.146

body armor will be provided to contractors if it is part of the terms and conditions
of the contract. . . . However, the officials said that commanders, at their
discretion, can provide body armor to any personnel within their area of operation.
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, if the government-drafted contract – or the
subcontract – fails to specify that CENTCOM will provide body armor, CENTCOM’s policy
is not to provide contractors with body armor unless the individual commander exercises his
or her discretion to do so.
143. As The New York Times columnist Paul Krugman suggested: “It’s one thing to
have civilians drive trucks and serve food; it’s quite different to employ them as personal
bodyguards to U.S. officials, as guards for U.S. government installations, and . . . as
interrogators in Iraqi prisons.” Schooner, Contractor Atrocities, supra note 56, at 5 (quoting
Paul Krugman, Battlefield of Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A29).
144. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 259.
145. Id. But see infra note 168 and accompanying text.
146. Id. at 256-257.
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that, while the American public may see
a distinction between U.S. contractors and the U.S. military, foreign nations
and enemy combatants may not. Indeed, “[t]he hanging of four Blackwater
contractors on a bridge in Fallujah in April 2004 demonstrated the extent to
which our enemies see no real difference between the U.S. military and its
contract employees.”147
To be sure, there is considerable merit to employing contractors in
contingency operations, and it is absurd to assume that foreign nationals are
intentionally being employed solely as “shrapnel catchers.” Nevertheless,
the public needs to be aware that the use of foreign nationals as contractors
has the potential to greatly reduce the number of uniformed (and U.S.
citizen) casualties, as the level of troop fatalities would certainly not remain
constant were the U.S. military less dependent on contractors.
IX. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION
We see an analogy between the government’s extensive use of foreign
contractors and the economic arguments that contributed to eliminating the
draft in the early 1970s. The economist Walter Oi demonstrated how the
draft turned soldiers into an inexpensive labor force that could be easily
misused, resulting in a loss of well-being, motivation, and effectiveness for
draftees and draft-induced volunteers. 148 Oi also showed that instituting an
all-volunteer military force, while more expensive per soldier, could
actually be more effective and result in fewer casualties because of the
increased wages and training the government provided. Because of the
larger investment made in each soldier under an all-volunteer force, the
government was less inclined to misuse this labor and more likely to care
about reducing casualty rates.149
As some scholars have suggested, in the absence of conscription, a
market-based regime should reduce the public’s concerns regarding the
deployment of military resources.
If military “service” is really just a job, if forces can quit at any
time, and if combatants need not be citizens at all, then the public
demand for information relevant to forces and the legislative
interest in their safety should be further weakened. All things being
equal, public consent for actions abroad that use hired forces should
be easier to obtain.150

147. ALLISON STANGER, ONE NATION UNDER CONTRACT 100 (2009).
148. See Walter Y. Oi, Should We Bring Back the Draft?, REGULATION (2007),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n3/v30n3-2.pdf.
149. See id.
150. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 242.
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Minimal support exists for this perception today. From a similar
economic viewpoint, we wonder if the lack of data on contractor fatalities
in Iraq and Afghanistan directly or indirectly affects contractor recruitment
and salary. If contractor fatality rates, as indicated above, are significantly
higher than what the labor pool currently understands, prospective
contractor employees are not able to fully assess and factor in the full risk
of fatality in their salary (and insurance) negotiations.151 We envision an
economic model in which, if perfect information regarding the historical
(and projected) risks of service in the battle area were available, this
information could hinder contractor recruitment and, potentially,
dramatically drive up contractor salaries.152
We see this latter phenomenon potentially exacerbating anti-contractor
sentiment. Unfortunately, there already is a broadly-voiced concern within
the public and the media that contractors receive higher pay than their
military counterparts.153 Despite repetitive outcry, little data supports this
proposition, particularly when costs associated with education, training,
healthcare, and retirement are factored in.154 Of course, we do not assume
that enlisted men and women necessarily receive market-based salaries; a
broad range of benefits – ranging from educational opportunities (e.g., the
GI Bill, service academy degree programs, ROTC scholarships), skills
training and experience, opportunities to work and live abroad, retirement
and health benefits, to fulfillment of a sense of duty or patriotism – permit
the government to pay soldiers below-market wages. Indeed, recent media
151. As an analogy, consider the fact that “[m]ost individual aid workers remain
uninformed about the new levels of risk and the weakness of their legal protections. . . .
Denial, ignorance, negligence and machismo are all costly.” Thomas, supra note 64, at 59.
152. See LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 33.
153. See, e.g., Ron Nixon, Government Pays More in Contracts, Study Finds, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2011); Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring
Contractors, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.pogo.org/pogofiles/reports/contract-oversight/bad-business/co-gp-20110913.html.
154. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONTRACTORS’ SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN IRAQ
(2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/MainText.3.1.shtml (“The
costs of a private security contract are comparable with those of a U.S. military unit
performing similar functions. During peacetime, however, the private security contract
would not have to be renewed, whereas the military unit would remain in the force
structure.”). See also Is DHS Too Dependent on Contractors?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. at 2 n.5 (2007) (statement of Professor Steven L.
Schooner, Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=022f
8766-0aca-4638-9e35-c2e42fc76159:
Slavish focus upon the relative cost of contractor support is misguided.
Specifically, it is not productive to criticize agencies for paying contractors “too
much” without: (1) permitting an agency to hire additional personnel; (2)
confirming that sufficient personnel are available in the marketplace and willing to
work for the government; (3) comparing “apples to apples,” such as taking into
account all of the costs of civil servants or members of the armed services; and (4)
considering critical issues such as flexibility and surge capacity.
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attention has focused on evidence that the cost of supporting military troops
in Iraq and Afghanistan is as high as one million dollars per soldier, which
demonstrates that cost may not readily correlate with salary.155 Also, as
previously stated, most, if not all, foreign nationals employed as U.S.
contractors are paid considerably less than our military soldiers.156
Nevertheless, we fear that, should the fatality data become more accurate
and accessible, the corresponding increases in contractor salaries would
only increase public antipathy (if not animosity) towards the general loss of
contractor life.157
X. WHY TRANSPARENCY MATTERS
Over the course of the last decade, the public has become – ever-soslowly – increasingly aware of the extent of government’s dependence upon
contractors.
Part of this derives from an Obama administration
commitment to greater transparency in government operations.158 In its
February 2011 Interim Report to Congress, the U.S. Commission on
Wartime Contracting brought attention to the disturbing number of
contractor fatalities:
While doing their jobs, contractors risk being killed, wounded, or
captured. Between September 2001 and December 2010, over
2,200 contractor employees of all nationalities have died and over
49,800 were injured in Iraq and Afghanistan. These contractors’

155. See Lawrence Korb & Laura Conley, The $1 Million Soldier: What’s Wrong With
How We Budget War, CNNMONEY.COM (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://money.cnn.
com/2011/04/04/news/economy/war_costs_lawrence_korb/index.htm?source=cnn_bin&hpt=
Sbin.
156. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 3.
157. Scholars have also expressed concerns about the “financial” motivation of
contractors:
On the battlefield itself, contractors operate in a murky legal zone outside the
regular chain of command. Employees of private military firms answer neither to
the U.S. military nor to the indigenous population they are involved in defending.
They answer to the company that employs them. One can easily imagine scenarios
where a contract employee, unlike his uniformed counterpart, has the right to walk
away. He or she cannot be ordered to fulfill a dangerous mission, yet attainment
of shared objectives depends on the contractor’s support. When American life and
liberty are on the line, financial incentives alone cannot inspire selfless and
courageous action. Contractors thus introduce into any military operation a degree
of uncertainty that is not present when soldiers perform the same task.
STANGER, supra note 147, at 90.
158. At the start of his presidency, President Obama publicly committed himself and his
Administration “to creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government.”
Presidential Memorandum, Transparency and Open Government, (Jan. 9, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/transparency-and-open-government.
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deaths and injuries should not be ignored, but should be a part of the
public debate on the cost of war.159
To our knowledge, this was the first official comment by Congress or a
government commission that contractor fatalities should be discussed in
policy circles. We thus applaud the Commission for further drawing
attention to this issue in its Final Report:
The extensive use of contractors obscures the full human cost of
war. The full cost includes all casualties, and to neglect contractor
deaths hides the political risks of conducting overseas contingency
operations. In particular, significant contractor deaths and injuries
have largely remained uncounted and unpublicized by the U.S.
government and the media. . . . Moreover, contractor deaths are
undoubtedly higher than the reported total because federal statistics
are based on filed insurance claims, and many foreign contractors’
employees may be unaware of their insurance rights and therefore
unlikely to file for compensation.160
Early in 2012, we saw further glimpses of progress.161 Frank Kendall,
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, raised the issue at a large conference in New York.162 On
159. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, AT WHAT RISK?, supra note 18, at 8.
160. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING, FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 30-31.
161. Previously, Allison Stanger briefly mentioned, in her book, One Nation Under
Contract, a New York Times report from 2007 on contractor fatalities. STANGER, supra note
147, at 99. See also, JACQUES S. GANSLER, DEMOCRACY’S ARSENAL: CREATING A TWENTYFIRST CENTURY DEFENSE INDUSTRY, 115-116 (2011).
162. See Transcript of Frank Kendall, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, at the Cowen Group’s 33rd Annual
Aerospace/Defense Conference (New York, Feb. 8, 2012). Secretary Kendall closed his
speech with this meaningful anecdote:
Terence Hildner …was a brigadier general in the army [who died in Kabul]. He
came back to Dover … on a C17. I went to Dover for the transfer of the remains.
… There's a dignified transfer which is a very solemn and kind of heart wrenching
for the families but moving ceremony. . . .
There was one other person on that C-17 and it was a contract employee of a
Canadian firm. After we had done the transfer for General Hildner, General Austin,
myself, General Mason and the Colonel did the Dignified Transfer for that
Canadian citizen who was a contractor serving with us in Afghanistan.
I find that very symbolic of the service that industry is providing to us and that you
really are part of all this with us. I think that the respect and the dignity with which
we did that and the fact that we all stayed to do it, sends sort of a message about
how we feel …. It is … a way to say, “Thank you” for that.
Id. at 9-10. Mr. Kendall’s specificity, and his eloquence on this topic, distinguish him from
his predecessors and his colleagues.
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February 12, 2012, The New York Times became the first major news outlet
to publish a front-page article on the risks facing contractors in the
battlespace.163
Sadly, other media outlets have lost interest in the story, and the public
remains largely ignorant of the extent of sacrifice in the contractor
community. The news media rarely investigates or reports on these
disturbing trends.164 Regardless of whether the public is more or less
sensitive to contractor deaths than military deaths, the fact remains that the
public “is much less likely to know about” the contractor deaths.165
Granted, the nature of contingency contracting, which includes numerous
functions and spans numerous agencies, is much more diffuse than our
well-structured and hierarchical military and often complicates the
collection and aggregation of relevant data.166 Nevertheless, as the military
and the government struggle to determine the appropriate role for, and
limits to, outsourcing,167 it is disconcerting that the public does not know
and cannot acknowledge the extent to which contractors have made the
ultimate sacrifice.
Much of the research on casualty sensitivity did not anticipate the
contemporary use of surrogates for military jobs. It is uncertain, therefore,
exactly how an increased awareness of contractor fatalities would affect
public opinion. We assert that most moral or philosophical distinctions
between military and contractor deaths, upon examination, quickly break
down. A contractor killed today supporting the military mission is a proxy
for a prior generation’s soldier.168 At least one survey suggests that
respondents expressed somewhat similar responses – in terms of anger and
sadness – upon reading about deaths among contractors and soldiers.169
163. Nordland, supra note 50, at A1 (“This is a war where traditional military jobs,
from mess hall cooks to base guards and convoy drivers, have increasingly been shifted to
the private sector. Many American generals and diplomats have private contractors for their
personal bodyguards. And along with the risks have come the consequences: More civilian
contractors working for American companies than American soldiers died in Afghanistan
last year for the first time during the war.”).
164. Indeed, before 2008, “[f]ew newspapers, and none of the major newspapers, have
covered the story.” Schooner, Why Contractor Fatalities Matter, supra note 86, at 78 n.3.
The Houston Chronicle was a notable, but rare, exception. See David Ivanovich, Contractor
Deaths up 17 Percent Across Iraq in 2007, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 10, 2008, at A1.
165. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 232.
166. Id. at 245.
167. See, e.g., Publication of the Officer of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy
Letter 11-01, Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg.
56227, 56236 (Sept. 12, 2011).
168. STANGER, supra note 147, at 10 (noting that “[w]ithout contractors, who supply the
vast majority of the support services in Iraq in order to free up military personnel for combat
roles, the Bush administration would have had to institute a draft to wage its war there.”).
169. Id. at 258 (“The facts that these assessments were no more positive among soldiers
should occasion surprise among those who would expect the use of contractors to decrease
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Anecdotal evidence from online media sources, however, suggests a
dramatically different result. Indeed, we have been not only disappointed
but taken aback by the volume and intensity (or, maybe more accurately,
venom) of anti-contractor sentiment expressed in online comment in
reaction to prior publications discussing contractor fatalities (e.g., in The
Washington Post and ProPublica).170
Some people certainly view contractors as expendable profiteers or
adventure seekers who are not entitled to the same respect as military
personnel.171 Similar arguments, however, were made in the late 1960s by
opponents to an all-volunteer military force. As discussed in Sol Tax’s, The
Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives, economist Milton Friedman
fiercely responded at a conference in December 1966 at the University of
Chicago:

political costs because people care less about contractor deaths.”).
170. See, e.g., Steven Schooner, Remember Them, Too: Don’t Contractors Count When We
Calculate the Costs of War? (May 25, 2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/24/AR2009052401994_Comments.html. A representative sample
follows:
“[I] do not feel they have a place of honor next to our military. Not even close.”;
“[C]ontractors are mercenaries [stet] and I’m sorry but they just don’t count the
same as the man or woman in uniform putting their life on the line because they
wear the uniform and fight for Our Country[.]”; “Why memorialize
contractors? . . . They. Don’t. Matter.”; “I have little compassion for all those
contractors, . . . They do what they do for the money. The fact that that job might
get them killed is something [they] need to factor into their considerations of
whether the salary is worth it. . . . Mercenaries are mercenaries, and if they want
their own memorial day, let them have it. In secret, as befits mercenaries.”; “[T]o
compare the sacrifice of the men and women of our armed forces to the human
cost of for-profit civilian contractors is nonsense.”; “A mercenary is never the
same as a patriot. Money does matter. It is the difference between a wife and a
prostitute.”; “Sorry - no matter what nice new job title you dream up, these
‘contractors’ are mercenaries. They . . . have never, ever been accorded any honor.
They should not expect it now.”; “Why should mercenaries be counted among the
honored dead? . . . They are truly the most despicable people on the planet. . . .
This is the most ridiculous suggestion I’ve ever heard and is an insult to everyone
who’s ever worn the uniform.”; “I bet they’re all burning in hell.”
See also T. Christian Miller, This Year, Contractor Deaths Exceed Military Ones in Iraq and
Afghanistan, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://www.propublica.org/article/
this-year-contractor-deaths-exceed-military-ones-in-iraq-and-afgh-100923#comments.
Of
course, we do not suggest that online commenting accurately represents, well, anything. But
these comments differ dramatically from Avant & Sigelman’s interpretation of their survey
data. See Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 256-261.
171. Id. Popular culture reinforces these perceptions. In the movie Clerks (View
Askew Prods. 1994), Dante Hicks (played by Brian O’Halloran) and Randal Graves (played
by Jeff Anderson) discuss the implications of independent contractors that were killed with
the destruction of the second Star Wars Death Star. Randal claimed that “any independent
contractors who were working on the uncompleted Death Star were innocent victims when it
was destroyed by the Rebels.” CLERKS (View Askew Prods. 1994). A roofer butts into the
conversation, retorting that “any contractor working on that Death Star knew the risk
involved. If they got killed, it’s their own fault.” Id.
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My army is “volunteer,” your army is “professional,” and the
enemy’s army is “mercenary.” All these three words mean exactly
the same thing. I am a volunteer professor, I am a mercenary
professor, and I am a professional professor. And all you people
around here are mercenary professional people. . . . It’s . . . a
puzzle . . . why people should think that . . . “mercenary” somehow
has a negative connotation. I remind you . . . that . . . Adam Smith .
. . said, “You do not owe your daily bread to the benevolence of the
baker, but to his proper regard for his own interest.” . . . In fact, I
think mercenary motives are among the least unattractive that we
have.172
Regardless of whether the public values the loss of a military or
contractor life differently, there can be no question that, currently, the
public receives far more accessible, current, accurate, and compelling
information on military deaths than it receives on contractor fatalities. This
means the public is not receiving a full accounting. Accordingly:
The central effect of relying on [contractors] is to reduce the
public’s knowledge about a portion of the war’s casualties. . . . An
individual death evokes sympathy – and a sense that the
government is responsible for it – regardless of whether the person
who died is a soldier or a contractor. . . . These findings suggest the
need to reconsider the relationship between citizenship, public
consent, and the human cost of war.173
The public cannot be expected to make a fully informed decision
without full access to complete information. Encouraging transparency to
increase public awareness of the role that contractors currently play on the
battlefield is a task that desperately needs to be undertaken by our political
leaders.174
CONCLUSION
An honest, accurate tally of the human toll of military conflicts plays a
critical role in a representative democracy. Yet the public, the media, and
American policy-makers currently lack relevant, accurate data. The
pervasive deployment of contractors on the modern battlefield requires the
injection of contractor deaths into the casualty sensitivity equation.
172. THE DRAFT: A HANDBOOK OF FACTS AND ALTERNATIVES 366 (Sol Tax ed.,
University of Chicago Press 1976).
173. Avant & Sigelman, supra note 31, at 260.
174. Id. at 261 (“The public cannot be said to have consented to something that it does
not know about.”).
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Although research conducted by CRS and GAO has increased insight into
this complicated analysis, much work remains.
Congress must
affirmatively take cognizance of the issue. We also encourage DoD to
foster discussion and thinking about these issues at its senior service
schools, and to fund both empirical and survey research inside and outside
of the government.
We think it perhaps most important to encourage the media to report
responsibly on the true human costs of the government’s contemporary
military actions.175 This tally, particularly to the extent that it proves
inconsistent with conventional wisdom, is important for the public – and
Congress – to grasp, in order to understand both the level of the military’s
reliance on contractors and the extent of contractor sacrifice. Increasingly,
contractors make the ultimate sacrifice, and that sacrifice merits respect and
gratitude. Ultimately, the public weighs the intangible benefits of achieving
foreign policy objectives against the most tangible costs imaginable – the
lives of those sacrificed to achieve those objectives.176 In weighing that
balance, all lives must be counted.

175. The media’s failure to force contractor deaths more clearly into the public
consciousness appears similar (and equally inexplicable) to its failure to aggressively seek
and publish military casket photos. Generations of Americans were exposed to the harsh
realities of armed combat by stark images – in newspapers and on television screens – of
flag-draped coffins. But the exposure ceased during much of the last decade, until President
Obama lifted the ban on such images in 2009. Although the policy banning media access to
Dover Air Force Base dated back to 1991, its ramifications were not as significant until the
“global war on terror” commenced. Professor Ralph Begleiter successfully sued the DoD in
2004 under the FOIA to gain access to government photographs of the Honor Guard and
subsequently posted them on the web through the National Security Archive at George
Washington University. The ban, however, effectively continued because, as Thomas
Blanton, Director of the National Security Archive, and Begleiter suggest, the litigation
prompted the Pentagon to stop photographing the ceremonies. See, e.g., Return of the
Fallen, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK NO. 152 (April 28, 2005),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB152/index.htm (quoting
Begleiter as he lamented that “[h]iding these images from the public – or, worse, failing even
to record these respectful moments – deprives all Americans of the opportunity to recognize
their contribution to our democracy, and hinders policymakers and historians in the future
from making informed judgments about public opinion and war.”).
176. Contrast this with Larson’s conclusion: “When asked to support a military
operation, the American public ultimately must weigh the intangible benefits of achieving
foreign policy objectives against the most tangible costs imaginable – the lives of U.S.
service personnel.” LARSON, CASUALTIES AND CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 99 (emphasis
added). Such a conclusion no longer reflects the realities of the modern battlefield.

